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4Editorial
Welcome to the seventh issue of the
Richmond Journal of Philosophy.  
We begin with a discussion by Alan
Thomas on the nature of liberalism
and then move onto Peter Goldie’s
consideration of the relationship
between personality and the
possibility of explaining how people
can surprise us by what they do.    This
is followed by the second part of
Garrath Williams’ discussion of our
understanding of moral responsibility.
Having examined the views of
Aristotle in the previous issue
attention now turns to the views of
Immanuel Kant.  Our fourth paper by
Christopher Hamilton  focuses on sex,
and in particular on the conception of
sexual desire.  After sex Mat Carmody
invites us to think about vagueness,
outlining the problems vagueness
poses for our understanding and
knowledge of the world and some
possible responses.     Scientific
knowledge is often regarded as
enjoying a special status.  In our final
paper Jennifer Booth reflects upon
rival models of scientific knowledge in
assessing how we should regard the
nature of such knowledge.
The motivation for and ambition of the
journal is to provide serious
philosophy for students who are at an
early stage in their philosophical
studies.  The style and content of the
papers will be accessible to students
who have yet to become hardened to
the more technical and specialised
journals of professional philosophy.  
What do we mean by ‘serious’
philosophy?   First, the content of the
journal is not constrained by a remit to
appeal to or reach the interested
general public.  Whilst the papers
must speak to the needs of students
who are relatively inexperienced in
philosophy, they presuppose that their
audience is actively engaged in
philosophy.  Second, the content is
serious in its focus on the central
areas of philosophy.  One must beware
of the dangers of trying to impose
more precision on a subject than its
nature will allow.  Therefore, some
degree of caution is called for in
talking of the central areas of
philosophy.  Nonetheless, the big or
traditional questions of metaphysics,
epistemology, and ethics will provide
the journal’s centre of gravity.  The
third way in which the philosophy is
serious is through the scope, variety
and depth of analysis that can be
achieved by the accumulation of
papers over time.  Moreover, each
paper is not simply an introduction to
one of the main topics on A-level, IB
or degree courses.   Such papers will
indeed have a role in the journal, but
they will not be the only kind.  Our
contributors will be offering original
papers based on their own research.
The journal will be a forum for the kind
of critical engagement and debate
that characterise the practice of
philosophy.  The fourth way in which
the philosophy is serious is in the
contributors themselves.  The vast bulk
of the papers will be written by
professional philosophers engaged in
both research and teaching.
[Editorial]
Purpose of the Journal
Stephen Grant is a full-time lecturer in
philosophy at Richmond upon Thames
College.  He has also taught at King’s
College London where he is
completing his doctorate on the
emotions.  His main interests are in
the emotions, ethics and political
philosophy.  He has published on the
ontological argument.
Dr Paul Sheehy teaches philosophy at
Richmond upon Thames College and
King’s College London.  His main areas
of interest are in metaphysics, political
and moral philosophy and the
philosophy of the social sciences.  His
doctoral thesis was on the ontological
and moral status of social groups, and
he has published papers on social
groups, voting and explanation and
realism.
Paul Sperring is head of the philosophy
department at Richmond upon Thames
College and an A-level examiner in
philosophy. He completed his
undergraduate and masters studies at
The University of Warwick, studying
both analytic and continental
philosophy. He is currently working
towards his PhD at Birkbeck College.
His research interests are metaphysics
and the philosophy of mind.
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Board
There are many different forms of
political organization in the world.
What is it that makes a form of
government for a particular society a
liberal one? Within such a society,
what demands does liberalism place
upon the citizens who live within its
boundaries? As an approximate
answer to the first question,
necessarily generalizing over centuries
of liberal practice and theory, a liberal
society is a society that prioritises,
above other political values, the
freedom of the individual as a political
ideal. The way in which liberalism
secures this priority is twofold: first,
an individual is assigned certain basic
rights and liberties. Second, to make
these rights and liberties practical and
politically effective, such a society also
pursues an ideal of equality. As an
approximate answer to the second
question, the question that will be the
main focus of this article, liberalism
demands that its citizens be, well,
liberal citizens. But there are more, or
less, ambitious accounts of that in
which liberal citizenship consists.
The balance between the two priorities
within liberalism, between basic rights
and equality, determines the different
forms of liberal political theory. At one
extreme, a liberal may assume that our
basic moral rights are prior to politics
and severely constrain the political
process. The pursuit of equality, as a
goal of a state’s redistributive policies,
would represent an interference with
certain basic moral rights, such as the
right to acquire, hold and transfer
private property. This can be
represented as the view that, in the
conflict between freedom and
equality, freedom should be given a
stronger emphasis. More egalitarian
liberalisms see the reality and efficacy
of certain basic rights as themselves
underwritten by a more demanding
ideal of equality, perhaps one that only
permits inequality in so far as doing so
would improve the situation of the
very worst off. On this view permitted
inequalities must benefit the worst off
so that, metaphorically, as the ‘ceiling’
of the rewards of the most highly paid
rises, so it drags up the ‘floor’ with it,
improving the lot of the comparatively
worst off. This second view can be
understood as the claim that equality
is prior to freedom or, perhaps more
accurately, as the view that a proper
understanding of that which freedom
consists in undermines any general
contrast between these two values.
Equality, on this second view, is an
essential condition of the meaningful
exercise of those basic liberties
protected by our most fundamental
rights: perhaps those rights given
protection by the constitution of the
state. There is a very basic
disagreement between these rival
views about the relative importance of
morality and politics, and which is
allowed to constrain the other.
However, recent arguments within
liberal political theory have focused
not so much on this perennially
controversial issue of the nature of the
demands of equality, but on the wider
question of the legitimacy of a liberal
political order itself. If the debate
between a more libertarian, freedom
based and a more egalitarian, equality
based liberal theory is about how we
implement a liberal political theory,
the issue of legitimacy asks why we
should be liberals at all. The issue of
legitimacy concerns the most
fundamental of political issues,
namely, what makes a particular form
of government legitimate for the
people that it governs. This is not the
question of whether a citizen of a
state agrees, in any particular case,
with the policies of those that govern
her. Accepting that a government is
legitimate is compatible with very
substantial disagreement about
government policy. Indeed if, as many
have argued, politics is fundamentally
about accommodating disagreement6
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What does a 
Society demand of its Citizens?
and preventing it spilling over into
factionalism and violence, then this
aspect of legitimacy is crucial to
understanding what it is to set up a
political order. When we collectively
agree to be governed by a particular
form of political organization and, in
particular, to give it a monopoly over
the legitimate use of force and to
allow it to determine what is to
happen rightly, even if that does not
always co-incide with what we
personally take to be right, we set up
an order to govern our political life
together that is legitimate. We accept,
as it were, the fundamental ground
rules of a game, not the particular
moves that occur within it. 
All liberal political theories claim that
liberalism has certain fundamental
advantages over other forms of
political organization when it comes
to the issue of legitimation. Liberal
political theories claim that their
legitimacy can be demonstrated to
each citizen, on a rational basis. The
reasons given for the legitimacy of a
liberal political order can, moreover, be
the same reason for each citizen or
group of citizens: you don’t have to
give different reasons to different
groups or different people.
Furthermore, this process of
justification can be transparent to all
and does not rest on a lack of
truthfulness or on coercion or
deception. The legitimating narratives
of other forms of political
organization, the liberal claims, will be
found wanting in comparison with
these features of liberal legitimacy.
Despotic regimes go through a sham
process of legitimation, but its
fraudulent character is brought out by
the fact that the only thing sustaining
that claim to legitimacy is the very
same blatant exercise of power that
the justification seeks to endorse.
All liberals seek to advance a
legitimate political conception, but
the more demanding a liberalism, the
more it will try to demonstrate that it
can be assented to by everyone. At this
point the rarefied atmosphere of
political theory makes contact with
the practicalities of everyday politics,
as it is undoubtedly true that the more
egalitarian form of liberalism, that
which justifies inequality solely in
cases where doing so would benefit
the worst off, bears less of a relation
to the dominant political theories that
underlie political practice in the
contemporary United Kingdom and
United States. It seems that a
significant minority of the electorate
of those democracies feel that a more
demanding forms of liberal equality is
too demanding: that it generates a
system in which the State is too
involved in the redistribution of
resources that those citizens believe to
be rightfully theirs. I note this thought
without endorsing it; on a more
plausible view, nothing is anyone’s
until the entire system of allocating
and transferring resources for a whole
society has been set up.
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That is one ground on which one
might be reluctant to embrace
liberalism, even if one were to regard
the view rejected as a legitimate
option. But another aspect of the
problem facing this particular form of
egalitarian liberalism, a form
associated with the American political
philosopher John Rawls, strikes more
fundamentally at the question of the
legitimacy of the view itself. Suppose
one came to think that the view was,
in a sense, exclusionary, or sectarian?
This is not the worry that, if one were
subject to the demands of a Rawlsian
society, one would take its
requirements to be too demanding.
This is the deeper anxiety that one
could not be subject to such demands
or, at least, that a person able to
become subject to such demands
would not be recognizably you as you
would have given up on a valuable
form of life that is very important to
your moral identity. On what grounds
might one think that?
On the grounds that liberalism
represents a form in which we might
choose to organize our social life, but
not the only available form and that
there are valuable ways of living,
which would be incompatible with a
liberal way of living. Clearly, liberalism
has an individualistic bias, reflected in
its starting from the individualistic
notion of a right, or of a basic liberty.
While liberalism in its different forms
does have an account of the good of
community, such goods have to
emerge from within a context shaped
by the rights and protections assigned
to individuals. There are
comprehensible, indeed, familiar
ethical outlooks where individualism
does not receive such an unqualified
endorsement: ethical outlooks which
emphasize the goods of a traditional
outlook, or of a traditional way of life,
perhaps involving certain taken for
granted and hierarchical ways of
organizing social life. From such a
perspective organizing one’s social life
in terms of rights encourages strident
self-assertion, adversarial social
relations and a decline, not a
reinforcement in sociability. Yet the
liberal account of legitimacy clearly
aims to bring everyone on board and
not, in this way, to offer justifications
of liberalism that appeal solely to
those antecedently persuaded of its
attractions. Rawls came to the view
that his own early work, in which he
developed a compelling case for a
demanding liberal egalitarianism, had
failed to be sufficiently attentive to
this wider problem of legitimacy.
But was he right to be concerned in
this way? Rawls himself accepted the
point that no political view, not even
liberalism, can accommodate every
possible valuable way which humans
can devise to live together. It is
tempting to view liberalism as a
maximally accommodating view,
reflected in how broadly it
understands the scope of its own
legitimacy. But it would be a mistake
to see liberals as trying to stock their
own society with some maximally
inclusive smorgasbord of options, a
political analogue of the intergalactic
bar in Star Wars (where aliens from
many worlds share a drink, not a
collective political life). Furthermore,
liberals as a whole stand by the
attractiveness of the basis of liberal
legitimacy as opposed to those
traditional legitimating narratives
used to justify the divine right of kings
to rule, or the authority of a
traditional ‘ruling class’. Those
narratives rest on falsehood, or
coercion, or both.
Those most untroubled by this issue
are a group known as ethical liberals.
Represented by the contemporary
political philosophers William Galston
and Stephen Macedo, the ethical
liberal argues that it is both
undeniably true, yet not to be
regretted, that liberal political
societies shape the dispositions and
behaviour of those citizens governed
by that very same liberal order.
Corresponding to liberalism as a
political theory there is liberalism as a
personal ethical outlook. The two
stand in a mutually supporting
relationship. A liberal virtue ethic sees
a person’s ethical outlook as made up
of certain typical virtues of character:
liberal citizens are tolerant, open-
minded, experimental in attitude and
responsible. Responsibility is a key
virtue. That is one explanation as to
how liberal societies can afford to give
their citizens a substantial sphere of
life which is outside of the direct
control of the state, and yet not
collapse from the massive social costs
which might be brought about if
everyone within that state chose to
behave in that sphere completely
irresponsibly. A citizenry whose
recklessness and lack of moderation
led a majority to severe and chronic
self-inflicted ill health, or that spent
its time in the workplace either drunk
or stoned, would very quickly bring the
public services offered by a state to
breaking point. 
For ethical liberals, then, liberal
political practice is matched by a
liberal virtue ethic. Rawls came, in his
later work, to be concerned that his
account of liberal egalitarianism was8
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sectarian in the sense that it rested on
too narrow a basis of justification:
that it would appeal solely to those
who were already committed to a
liberal form of ethical life. Galston and
Macedo accept this circularity in the
justifications available to the liberal
very clear-sightedly. Liberalism, like
any other political view, will shape its
citizens in its own image and that is
not to be regretted. Macedo has even
claimed that, through time, all liberal
societies will converge on a single
basic pattern and, more provocatively,
that the best contemporary example
of the pattern is contemporary
California. 
To articulate this dispute more clearly,
take an example from the American
political philosopher John Tomasi and
divide people into three broad classes.
The first group are, in their personal
attitudes and behaviour, committed to
the very aspects of character that
Galston and Macedo call the liberal
virtues. Open-minded, tolerant and
experimental, this group of people
value diversity and change in their
personal and social lives, welcome
exposure to novelty and difference
and value crafting a distinctive and
individual moral identity. The second
group of people structure their lives by
some traditional source of identity
which is ‘foundational’ for them,
whether religious or not. 
This group dislike individual self-
assertion and while they value the
option of appealing to the
individualistic rights discourse of
liberalism, they do not value exercising
that option as it seems to them a last
resort that marks a breakdown in
social relations. Their overall view is
marked by respectfulness towards
traditional sources of authority. The
third group simply don’t have a
consistent and fully worked out set of
principles or attitudes; a mixture of
groups one and two, different parts of
their lives involve different degrees of
respect for tradition or authority,
experimentation and ‘standing out
from the crowd’. 
We can now put Rawls’s concern this
way: the first group will clearly have
no problem accepting the legitimacy
of liberalism not, at least, in terms of
its justifiability to them from their
own perspective. The third group are,
shall we say, ripe for conversion: it will
be possible so to mould their attitudes
and expectations that they will come,
through time, to resemble the first
group. The point of concern is the
second group. Do we, at this point,
simply remind ourselves that
liberalism cannot please everyone,
that it does not aim to accommodate
every possible valuable form of living
together and that no-one is entitled to
a level playing field? Through time,
particularly as children born within
this group are educated in the public
education system and exposed to the
wider influences of society, this group
will find it more and more difficult to
reproduce itself and will, slowly, ‘go
out of business’. 
Is this to be regretted? I think Galston
and Macedo are committed to the
view that while this would, indeed, be
regrettable, it is not regrettable in
such a way that a liberal state itself is
to blame for allowing it to happen. 
Rawls’s answer is that we should try
and do more: that we ought to affirm
unequivocally the importance of
politics and its priority over morality.
Politics imposes a special burden on
citizens, which is that, when they
come together to discuss fundamental
matters of political legitimacy, we owe
our fellow citizens a duty of restraint.
What we restrain ourselves from is
trying to justify legislation on the
basis of our own comprehensive moral
vision of the world, especially if we
believe that this view is not widely
shared. Reasonable people know that
people can, blamelessly, disagree over
fundamental issues about morality
even if all the views under
consideration are themselves
reasonable (no-one cares if
unreasonable world views go out of
business - the passing of the Klu Klux
Klan from liberal society is not
regrettable from anyone’s
perspective). What Rawls tries to do is
disjoin, or separate, our political
commitment to liberalism from any
particular general moral view that
might support it. But this is not to
detach politics from morality: the key
words are ‘any particular’ view that
might support it. What Rawls wants is
a situation in which each particular
general moral view offers its own
proprietary support for liberalism from
within its own particular perspective. 
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What you affirm is the common
ground between you and your fellow
citizens; the basis on which you affirm
is that which you could not put
forward to your fellow citizens
without violating your duty of
restraint. You know that if you put
those considerations forward to others
they would reject them as
unreasonable for that purpose - of
justifying political fundamentals - and
they would be right to do so. Rawls
called his later view of liberal
egalitarianism ‘modular’ and I think
what he meant by that metaphor is
now clear. It is a module that ‘slots in’
to different general moral views of the
world and is motivated from within
each such reasonable view, while not
being exclusively attached to any of
them. It derives its power to motivate
from its affirmation from within each
of these particular general moral
views.
Does this solve the problem? Rawls’s
aim is to give an account of the
legitimacy of liberalism to all three of
our representative groups. The second
group are clearly the crucial test case.
Can they affirm, from within their
traditional worldview, liberalism
construed as a political solution to a
political problem: the problem of how
to live together in a political
community that we genuinely share,
given that all sides agree that there
can be blameless disagreement about
the fundamentals of morality (as
opposed to politics)? Perhaps equally
importantly, can they affirm some
adaptation or extension of their
traditional worldview, adjusted to the
particular conditions of a liberal
society?  Rawls believed that the
answer to that question was ‘yes’; even
bearing in mind that liberalism does
not attempt to accommodate all
valuable forms of living together, it
can go a little further in drawing a
wider class of ethical outlooks within
its ambit.
I have taken the issue of legitimacy as
the focus of this article and there are
now two clearly conflicting answers to
the question of what a liberal society
demands from its citizens for
consideration. Ethical liberals ask that
the citizens of a liberal society adopt
the liberal virtues of criticism,
open mindedness, a taste for
experimentation and tolerance. Rawls,
in his later work, asks for a different
commitment, a demanding political
ideal that is expressed in his duty of
self-restraint. You are going to have to
accept, when you put forward a
political argument about
constitutional fundamentals, that a
certain kind of full or complete
justification is unavailable to you and
that you have, as it were, to ‘stay on
the surface’ and affirm that which you
share with all of your fellow citizens
from within a general moral outlook
on the world that, ex hypothesi, you do
not share with them in the same way.
But while in that respect you ‘stay on
the surface’ the commitment that
Rawls asks of you is by no means itself
superficial, but clearly in its own way
very demanding. Like his ethical liberal
rivals, Rawls places the demands of
citizenship centre stage, but he
understood liberal citizenship as a
certain narrowly defined political role.
But given the priority and importance
of politics it is the most important role
that we can be called upon to take up.
Those unconvinced by Rawls’s
arguments fear that the same problem
recurs: is it not true that we only
affirm liberalism on the basis of those
views that Rawls allows are reasonable
general moral views? As I have noted,
no one is concerned if, within a liberal
society, the ‘traditional forms of life’ of
the racist go out of business. But now
is Rawls’s restriction to reasonable
views going to introduce a new
circularity into what he is prepared to
see justified within liberalism? Only
reasonable views are allowed to count,
and what handle    do we have on
reasonableness independently of these
ways of living proving compatible with
Rawls’s later liberalism? I don’t think
that this criticism is justified, and the
comparison with the ‘ethical
liberalism’ of Galston and Macedo
shows why. 
The ethical liberal points to the
legitimation of liberalism and says:
liberalism recommends itself on its
own merits. It meets a high standard
of individual justification as legitimate
without falsehood or coercion. In that
sense any justification of it is circular:
it rests on its own merits, but to what
else can one appeal? The circularity of
resting on one’s own merits is still
clearly different from the circularity of
the ‘justifications’ offered by a
despotic regime, where justifications
are solely supported by the very
exercise of power that the account
tries to legitimate. Rawls accepts a
degree of inevitable circularity in good
justifications, those that do not rest on
the brute causality of power, but, as it
were, widen the circle. Our crucial
second group, the test case for the
transition within Rawls’s views, can be
brought within the terms of the liberal
settlement whereas within ethical
liberalism they cannot. That is an
incremental gain, but a gain
nonetheless, in arguments over the
appeal of liberalism as legitimate
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People sometimes surprise us by the
things that they do. What is the
explanation of this phenomenon? This
is a very general question, and I want
here to treat it as such. I do, however,
want to restrict the question to those
surprising things that people do that
are intentional actions, or things done
for a reason  in the particular sense
that Elisabeth Anscombe was
searching for in her book Intention.1
For people sometimes do surprising
things other than intentional actions.
Talleyrand, the great diplomat who
served the Ancien Régime, then the
Revolutionary government, then
Napoleon I, then the restoration of the
monarchy with Louis XVIII, and then
after the 1830 revolution with Louis-
Philippe, was said never to do
anything without intention, without a
good reason. When he finally died in
1838, Metternich, surprised, made this
famous remark: ‘I wonder what he
meant by doing that’. 
People don’t die intentionally, for
reasons in the sense required for
meaningful intentional action (suicide
is something quite different). And
that’s what makes Metternich’s
remark into a nice joke, as well as
indicating what is supposed to be
special about action as such,
according to which dying is not a kind
of action. 
So let me from now on limit my
question to intentional action, which I
will characterise as something done
for a reason, consisting of a belief and
an attitude towards this kind of action
(let’s from now on call it a desire, in
the knowledge that this term is
desperately vague; but nothing hangs
on it here). And this belief and desire
will give the answer why, in the sense
we want, people do the things that
they do; the belief and the desire
rationalise the action.2 Someone
opens the door of the fridge, and he
does this because he wants a beer and
believes that opening the door is the
best means of getting a beer,
believing, as he does, that there is a
beer in the fridge. Someone takes an
umbrella on her walk, and she does
this because she believes it’s going to
rain later on, because she wants not to
get wet, and because she believes that
taking an umbrella is the best means
of avoiding getting wet. This kind of
means-end, belief-desire explanation,
it is said, can be extended to explain
much more complex examples of
intentional action. 
11
What People will do: Personality and Prediction Peter Goldie 
Peter Goldie
What People will do:[Personality]
and Prediction
I
I accept that, in respect of all
intentional actions, these kinds of
belief-desire explanations are
available. Indeed, it seems to me that,
in our thinking about action, our own
and other people’s, we just take it for
granted-it is, I dare say, a priori-that
belief-desire explanations are always
going to be available; although, of
course, they may not always be found. 
However, a moment’s reflection on
these belief-desire explanations
should reveal just how thin they are,
partly because, in turn, they rely on
such a thin notion of rationality. To
rationalise an action in this thin sense
is just to show how it could make
sense for someone to do such a thing.
And it can often make sense to do one
of a diverse range of possible things. In
a restaurant you are brought the
wrong flavour of ice-cream: you
ordered chocolate and you are brought
strawberry. It would make sense to tell
the waiter he has made a mistake; it
would make sense to eat what you are
given; it would make sense to leave it;
it would make sense to throw the ice-
cream on the floor and walk out of the
restaurant; it would make sense to
offer the ice-cream to your partner; it
would make sense to pour the ice-
cream onto your partner’s lap; and so
on. If you do one of these things, it’s
very likely that you didn’t at the time
consider all the other possible courses
of action that were open to you, or
perhaps any of them; the other
possibilities might not have entered
your mind. So we must not forget that
a belief-desire explanation doesn’t
explain why someone did one thing
rather than another which was also
open to him. 
The point emerges most starkly when
we turn to prediction: I ask you to
predict what a rational person (that’s
all we know about him or her) will do
if he or she is brought the wrong
flavour of ice-cream by a waiter in a
restaurant. ‘Well,’ you will sensibly
reply, ‘it depends.’ 
One of the things it depends on is
personality. Because I know my wife’s
personality, I can pretty reliably, I
think, predict what she would do in
such circumstances. However, I
acknowledge that my prediction might
be wrong: she might on a particular
occasion surprise me and do
something other than what would be
expressive of her personality. So what
she does must depend on more than
just her personality. 
To explain why I am right to
acknowledge that my wife might
surprise me in what she does, I need to
turn to E. M. Forster’s distinction,
which he makes in his Aspects of the
Novel, between flat and round
characters. ‘Flat characters’, he says,
‘were called “humours” in the
seventeenth century, and are
sometimes called types, and
sometimes caricatures. In their purest
form, they are constructed round a
single idea or quality ... The really flat
character,’ he continues, ‘can be
expressed in one sentence such as “I
will never desert Mr Micawber”. There
is Mrs Micawber-she says she won’t
desert Mr Micawber; she doesn’t, and
there she is’.3 Flat characters are
contrasted with round characters. ‘The
test of a round character,’ Forster says,
‘is whether it is capable of surprising
in a convincing way. If it never
surprises, it is flat. If it does not
convince, it is flat pretending to be
round. It [the round character] has the
incalculability of life about it’.4
It is because flat characters have this
‘single idea or quality’ that they never
surprise us; everything they do is
determined by whatever quality or
characteristic they are deemed to
have, and they never act contrary to,
or against, their type. We real life
human beings, in contrast, like my
wife, are round characters-all of us.
So, by definition, we round characters
are capable of surprising, and when
we surprise, we do so in a convincing
way.
The fact that people can surprise us by
what they do shows that we expected
them to do one particular thing, or one
of a range of things, and in fact they
did something different. Expectation
in this context is, I think, something
less that prediction, although it can
extend to prediction. Expectation can
involve simply taking some action or
other for granted, rather as you
expect-take it for granted-that
someone who buys a cup of coffee in
Caffé Nero will drink it and not throw
it on the floor, or that a tennis player
in the middle of a game will try to
return the ball and not try to imitate
Marlon Brando. Expecting what
someone will do in some circumstance
or other, as my ice-cream example
shows, and as these examples show,
involves more than just expecting
what any rational person would do:
the idea of rationality has to be
thickened out with personality. So,
given a particular person’s personality,
my wife’s for example, we can expect
that she will do one kind of action
amongst a range of possible rational
actions, and expect that she will not
do other kinds of action which it
would be equally rational to do. For
someone else with a different
personality from my wife’s, we may
expect them to do something else, and
not what we expect my wife to do.
This, personality and expectation or
prediction, is the first thing I will try to
explain.
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The second thing I will try to explain is
the confounding of our expectations
and predictions-the fact that we can
be surprised, in a convincing way,
when people do something other than
what we expect-when they act
contrary to what their personality
traits lead us to expect. 
Then, thirdly, I will try to draw some
practical conclusions from all this-
things that we round characters might
bear in mind in leading our lives, and
in judging ourselves and others. But
let me begin by saying something
about what I mean by personality.
What is a personality trait? Personality
traits-and here I include character
traits in this category-are dispositions.
All sorts of things have dispositions.
This glass is fragile. Its being fragile
(its fragility) is a disposition of the
glass. Dispositions like these can be
understood in terms of ‘if-then’
conditional statements: ‘if this glass
were to be thrown against the wall,
then it would break’. 
When we come to personality traits, to
say what the ‘if-then’ conditional
looks like in general is, I think, a
hopeless task, because personality
traits are so disparate in kind. There
are ways of acting, such as being
charming; there are relatively
enduring temperaments, such as being
cheerful, being nervous and being
gloomy; there are relatively enduring
emotional dispositions, such as
irascibility and being envious; there
are relatively enduring preferences
and values, such as being a book-lover,
being a foodie, liking football, and
disliking authority figures; there are
talents, such as being quick-witted;
and there are character traits, which
are, roughly, relatively enduring
dispositions to have certain kinds of
motives in certain kinds of situation,
and thus to act in certain kinds of
ways. 
‘If-then’ conditional statements for
personality traits are what Gilbert Ryle
has called ‘inference-tickets’-’season
tickets’ which allow us to explain and
predict motive and action on a
particular occasion.5 For example,
knowing that someone is a polite and
considerate person allows us to
predict that she will have particular
polite and considerate motives if she
sees that her fellow dinner-guest
needs the salt, and thus that she will
pass the salt in a polite way. 
Flat characters have a single
personality trait, which can be utterly
relied upon to issue in the relevant
kind of action on all occasions. Thus
flat characters do not-they cannot-
surprise us. But, as Forster rightly says,
flat characters are only to be found in
novels; it is a kind of prejudice-a kind
of stereotyping-to flatten out real life
people. So, for us real life people, we
need to build into our notion of
personality this capability of surprising
us. Any notion of reliability, of
predictability, in motive and action
must allow for the possibility of a
failure to be motivated or to act as our
ascription of personality traits allows
us to infer. One might put it like this:
an inference-ticket, a season ticket,
can fail on an occasion to get you to
your expected destination.
We could just build in to the ‘if-then’
conditional a ‘normally’, a ‘usually’, or
an ‘all other things being equal’, and
this would certainly allow for the
possibility of being surprised: a polite
person will normally or usually have
polite motives and act politely when it
is appropriate. Fair enough. However,
although this might explain how we
can be surprised-on those occasions
when the ‘normal’ or ‘usual’ doesn’t
apply-it isn’t going to be enough to
explain how we can be surprised in a
convincing way. So let’s now look at
the kinds of thing that can provide
convincing explanations of our
surprising failures to do as our
personality traits imply that we
should. 
13
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To remind you of what I said earlier, I
accept that all intentional action can
be explained by appeal to beliefs and
desires of the individual. However,
belief-desire explanations, thin as they
are, can be thickened out by appeal to
factors that influence the way
someone’s mind works on a particular
occasion, which can help to explain
why someone has motives-beliefs and
desires, intentions and so on-which
are not what we would expect from
his personality, and which, in turn, can
help to explain his acting contrary to
how we expected, and in a way that
initially surprises us. These factors are
not themselves entirely within what
has been called the ‘space of reasons’:
they so to speak bridge the divide
between the mental and the physical;
or rather, they throw into question the
very idea of there being such a divide.
I will put them into four broad
categories. 
First, there are states such as being
drunk, being under the influences of
drugs, having a bad cold, and being
deprived of sleep.6 A shy and retiring
man goes to a cocktail party. He
bumps into a woman whom he hasn’t
seen for many years. Suddenly, he is
struck by the thought that he has been
in love with her all this time, and,
quite out of character, he tells her as
much. We explain this by saying that
he had had two glasses of champagne
on an empty stomach; it was because
he was a little bit drunk that he did
what he did. What we would expect
him to do, given his personality, is to
have characteristically shy and retiring
thoughts-’I couldn’t possibly force my
attentions on her; I hardly even know
her.’ Perhaps on this occasion he did
have these thoughts, but normally,
usually, we would expect them to have
prevailed over any amorous
inclinations he might have felt; and
yet on this occasion they didn’t
prevail. You might think that this kind
of case exemplifies weakness of the
will. But weakness of the will is
something of a moral notion: it is not
straightforwardly obvious that the
champagne distorted his thinking, and
led him to allow inappropriate
deliberative influence to his amorous
inclinations: thinking and acting out
of character because of drink and
having your thinking distorted because
of drink are not necessarily the same
thing. Maybe she will turn out really to
be the love of his life, in which case, in
retrospect, we might come to agree
that, without the champagne, being
such a shy and retiring person, he
would have missed out on the chance
of his life. The champagne helped him
to relax, to properly lift up his eyes to
her beauty and her talents, and to
enable him to see her as she really is.
As Iris Murdoch put it, ‘By opening our
eyes we do not necessarily see what
confronts us. We are anxiety-ridden
animals. Our minds are continually
active, fabricating an anxious, usually
self-preoccupied, often falsifying veil
which partially conceals the world.’7
My second category is emotions like
being angry and being jealous, which,
although capable of being justified or
grounded in reasons, can influence
thinking in ways that lead people to
act contrary to what we would
otherwise expect and in an unjustified
way. You shout at your child for not
sitting up straight in his high chair, in
spite of being a caring and loving
parent. You do this because you are
angry. Your shouting at her can also be
given a belief-desire explanation: you
wanted her to sit up straight, and you
believed that shouting ‘Sit up
straight!’ at her was the best means of
getting her to do this. But why did you,
a caring and loving parent, have these
thoughts, so unusual for someone like
you? Because you were unjustifiably
angry, and because shouting at people
who won’t do what you want is
characteristic of angry behaviour. 
My third category is moods, relatively
short-term states like being depressed,
tense, irritable, full of unlocated
sexual desire. Her not going to work
today, in spite of being a diligent and
hardworking person, and much to the
surprise of her bosses, who has
expected her to be there, can be
explained by appeal to the fact that
she felt depressed when she woke up
this morning. Her being in this mood-
depressed-helps to explain why she
had the thoughts that she did, and
thus goes beyond the belief-desire
explanation. Perhaps what went on in
her mind at the time was the thought
that she might not be able to handle
this large and important deal, and the
thought that if she didn’t turn up to
work, then someone else would take
the deal off her hands. Our thicker
explanation-she was depressed-points
towards an explanation of why she
had those thoughts in spite of being
normally so diligent and hardworking.
Moods, in turn, can explain emotions,
and they often do so without
justifying them: for example, you got14
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unjustifiably angry with your child
because you were tense and irritable.
Sometimes, and this is my fourth
category, the explanation of an action
that surprises us appeals to the
influences of the particular situation
that the individual finds himself in: his
being in that situation brings about a
surprising influence on thinking. The
literature in social psychology these
days is replete with examples which
bring into question the reliability of
personality traits in certain situations.
I will mention just one. 
In the summer of 1971, Philip
Zimbardo, a psychologist at Stanford
University, carried out an experiment
on the effect of imprisonment. The
account that follows is either direct
citation from Zimbardo or paraphrase.
He and his colleagues took a sample of
24 college students from the U.S. and
Canada who happened to be in the
Stanford area and wanted to earn $15
a day by participating in a study. On all
measured dimensions, these students
were typically healthy, intelligent,
middle-class males. The participants
were arbitrarily divided into two
groups by a flip of the coin. Half were
randomly assigned to be guards, the
other to be prisoners. 
The ‘prisoners’ were brought to the
‘jail’ (in fact the converted basement
of the psychology department) one at
a time and greeted by the warden,
who conveyed the seriousness of their
offence and their new status as
prisoners. Each prisoner was
systematically searched, stripped
naked, and then deloused and issued
with a uniform, a heavy chain bolted
on the right ankle and worn at all
times, rubber sandals, and a stocking
cap made from a woman’s nylon
stocking. The guards were given no
specific training on how to be guards.
Instead they were told that they were
free, within limits, to do whatever they
thought was necessary to maintain
law and order in the prison and to
command the respect of the prisoners.
As with real prisoners, the prisoners in
this experiment expected some
harassment, to have their privacy and
some of their other civil rights violated
while they were in prison, and to get a
minimally adequate diet-all part of
their informed consent agreement
when they volunteered.
Because the first day passed without
incident, Zimbardo and his colleagues
were surprised by, and totally
unprepared for, the rebellion which
broke out on the morning of the
second day. The prisoners removed
their stocking caps, ripped off their
numbers, and barricaded themselves
inside the cells by putting their beds
against the door, taunting and cursing
the guards. The guards met force with
force: they used fire extinguishers to
get the prisoners away from the doors;
they broke into each cell, stripped the
prisoners naked, took the beds out,
forced the ringleaders of the prisoner
rebellion into solitary confinement,
and generally began to harass and
intimidate the prisoners. Once the riot
was under control, they stepped up the
violence and intimidation techniques.
Every aspect of the prisoners’
behaviour fell under the total and
arbitrary control of the guards. Even
going to the toilet became a privilege.
Prisoners were often forced to urinate
or defecate in a bucket that was left in
their cell, and sometimes the guards
would not allow prisoners to empty
these buckets, so that the prison
began to smell of urine and faeces.
After a rumoured prison break, which
in fact turned out to be false, the
guards again escalated very noticeably
their level of harassment, increasing
the humiliation they made the
prisoners suffer, forcing them to do
menial, repetitive work such as
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After five days, prisoners were seen
being marched on a toilet run, bags
over their heads, legs chained
together, hands on each other’s
shoulders. At this point, long before
the scheduled end of the experiment,
Zimbardo was made to realise the
psychological damage that the
experiment was causing to the
participants, and he quickly brought it
to a close. To quote Zimbardo, ‘We had
created an overwhelmingly powerful
situation-a situation in which
prisoners were withdrawing and
behaving in pathological ways, and in
which some of the guards were
behaving sadistically. Even the “good”
guards felt helpless to intervene, and
none of the guards quit while the
study was in progress’; ‘...not once did
any of the so-called good guards ever
contest an order by a sadistic guard,
intervene to stop or prevent despicable
behaviour by another guard, or come
to work late or leave early’. He reports
that, amongst both guards and
prisoners, ‘[N]one of our preliminary
personality tests were able to predict
this behavior. The only link between
personality and prison behavior was a
finding that prisoners with a high
degree of authoritarianism endured
our authoritarian prison environment
longer than did other prisoners.’8
Given this dissociation of behaviour
and personality, it would be a mistake
to make an inference from a given
type of behaviour on this single
occasion, such as the brutal behaviour
of many of the guards, to a brutal
personality trait, and then appeal to
that trait to predict and retrodict
further brutal behaviour across a
range of different kinds of situation. It
isn’t at all clear how to explain what
these people did in this prison
experiment, but I have no doubt that a
simple ‘brutal is who brutal does’ is far
too quick. The many experiments in
social psychology show both how
mistaken this is, and how prone we are
to make the mistake. 
Being drunk, being angry, being
depressed, becoming a prison guard in
particular circumstances: a large part
of our everyday psychology is
concerned with thicker explanations
that appeal to factors such as these.
And factors from each of my four
rough categories can interweave in a
complex network of narrative
explanation: emotion, such as anger,
can be explained by mood, such as
being tense and irritable, as we saw
earlier; being tense and irritable can
be explained by lack of sleep and by
situation, such as being harassed by a
domineering boss; and so on. These
narrative explanations explain through
showing, sideways on so to speak, why
people’s patterns of thinking-their
occurrent thoughts and choices-are as
they are, and why they come to do
things which surprise us. We find out,
through our own experience,
through literature and the arts,
through reading newspapers, what
characteristic influences various kinds
of factors have. Being drunk often
explains why people give way to
temptation; we all know it can be a
terribly expensive thing to go
shopping after a boozy lunch. Being
angry often explains why people do
things like shout at their child or
throw the wrong flavour of ice-cream
on the floor; we all know the best
thing to do when you’re angry is to
count backwards from a hundred.
Being depressed often explains why
we shirk from getting down to our
work; we all know this too. Being
thrown into an unusual situation
without proper preparation, such as
becoming a prison guard, can often
explain why you behave as you
shouldn’t. It’s all very human and
understandable. 
What practical conclusions can be
draw from all this? I would like to
mention two, both of which bear
specifically on character, rather than
more widely on personality. The first
concerns judgement. Let’s say that
some influencing factor leads you to
act out of character in ways that were
unexpected, and that this involved
acting badly. We all thought, as did
you, that you had some virtue-
courage, say-and yet when you come
to be tested you failed to act as you
should have done. At the crucial
moment, you acted to save your own
life, in disregard of the others whom
you should have helped. 
Now, what I’ve been saying suggests
two things. First, and this I mentioned
earlier in relation to the Zimbardo
prison experiment, we shouldn’t
simply brand you as having a bad
character, as being a coward,
‘cowardly is as cowardly does’, just
because of this one action. It’s quite
possible that you really are a
courageous person, but less than fully
virtuous, so courageous action isn’t
guaranteed on every occasion. After
all, only flat characters are fully
virtuous, and you are a round
character. Secondly, we are round
characters too, so we cannot rest
complacently in the secure knowledge
that our own virtue will smoothly
generate virtuous action in all
circumstances. So when we hear of
what you did-that so-called cowardly
action-we ought to reflect on the
fragility of character, and
acknowledge that we too might have
done what you did if we had been in
your circumstances. For who really
knows what we might have done? As
Marlow, Joseph Conrad’s narrator in
Lord Jim, said, ‘Let no soul know, for
the truth can be wrung out of us only16
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by some cruel, little, awful,
catastrophe’.9 
However, it is consistent with our
thinking that we might have done the
same as you in those circumstances, or
even that just about anyone would
have done the same as you in those
circumstances, also for us to think
that what you did was wrong, that you
are responsible for what you did, and
that you are to blame for it. Similarly,
you should blame yourself for what
you did. You should not hide behind
the influencing factor-being a
participant in the prison experiment
for example-as an excuse to get you
off the hook; as J. L. Austin said, some
excuses get us on the hook rather than
off it.10
But-and this is a point I cannot argue
for here-your blame of yourself should
not be misdirected, in remorsefully-
and remorselessly-looking backwards,
back to that one moment in your life,
that one moment of failure of
character. Without dodging
responsibility, and without avoiding
blaming yourself, you can focus your
thoughts not, remorsefully, on the
past, and on what you did wrong at
that single, fateful moment, but on
the future, and on changing yourself
so that you won’t make the same
mistake again. As Nietzsche so
brilliantly put it: ‘Never yield to
remorse, but at once tell yourself:
remorse would simply mean adding to
the first act of stupidity a second. - If
we have done harm we should give
thought to how we can do good’.11
The second practical conclusion, also
bearing on the fragility of character, is
that we should be circumspect about
the reliability of our character and our
motives on any particular occasion.
The real springs of human action are a
mystery, as much our own actions as
those of others; and sometimes more
so. Because we have names for things-
’motive’, ‘deciding’, ‘willing’, and so
on-we too readily conclude that there
is something very clear and precise
that the names stand for. We may be
able to deliberate about our motives,
decide what to do, and later explain or
make sense of what we have done-
using names for motives, for deciding,
for willing. But still, to quote
Nietzsche again:
... at the moment when we finally
do act, our action is often enough
determined by a different species of
motives than the species here
under discussion, those involved in
our ‘picture of the consequences’.
What here comes into play is the
way we habitually expend our
energy; or some slight instigation
from a person whom we fear or
honour or love; or our indolence,
which prefers to do what lies
closest to hand; or an excitation of
our imagination brought about at
the decisive moment by some
immediate, very trivial event; quite
incalculable physical influences
come into play; caprice and
waywardness come into play; some
emotion or other happens quite by
chance to leap forth; in short, there
come into play motives in part
unknown to us, in part known very
ill, which we can never take
account of beforehand.12
One might almost think that Nietzsche
had in mind the recent experiments in
social psychology when he wrote that.
The idea, then, is this: if we can’t be
sure of our own motives on an
occasion, or of our character, then we
would do well to realise this in
advance of the moment of action, and
to plan accordingly. This is what I
mean by circumspection-as the OED
has it, ‘attention to circumstances that
may affect an action or decision;
caution, care, heedfulness’. Like
Odysseus, who had his crew tie him to
the mast so he couldn’t sail towards
the tempting Sirens, we should
sometimes plot against our future
selves, by putting things in the way to
prevent our being unduly influenced to
act out of character.13 Circumspection
in forward planning is, like strength of
will, a kind of executive virtue. But
it comes temporally prior to
strength of will; without the proper
circumspection about our motives and
character, strength of will can both be
not enough and come too late. Don’t
rely on your character or your strength
of will to see you through when you
are tempted; better to keep yourself
out of the way of temptation, or to
keep temptation out of your way. 
17
What People will do: Personality and Prediction Peter Goldie 
There’s an interesting implication of
this. If you acknowledge, as I say you
should, that you are less than fully
virtuous, not wholly and completely
reliable in your actions, even (in that
telling expression) with the best will in
the world, then, somewhat ironically,
it is a mistake to ask yourself, in
thinking about what is the right thing
to do, ‘What would the virtuous
person do here?’. For the really
virtuous person, if there were such a
flat character outside the pages of a
novel, wouldn’t be led astray, and
could therefore blithely go into these
situations, in which the rest of us
would be tempted. So we shouldn’t do
what the fully virtuous person would
do. The better question to ask is, ‘What
would the virtuous person advise me
to do here?’. The virtuous person may
well wisely advise you to be
circumspect about your character and
motives, and, like Odysseus, to take
steps in advance to make it harder for
you to act out of character in ways
that you may well later come to
regret.14
We are all round characters, capable
of surprising in a convincing way.
Accordingly, we must not, like
Conrad’s Marlow, hope for the
impossible, ‘for the laying of what is
the most obstinate ghost of man’s
creation, [for the laying] of the uneasy
doubt uprising like a mist, secret and
gnawing like a worm, and more
chilling than the certitude of death-
the doubt of the sovereign power
enthroned in a fixed standard of
conduct’.15
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In the first part of this article
[Ed.- Which appeared in RJP Issue 6],
I discussed two important
understandings of moral responsibility.
One approach links responsibility to
the idea of free will, an idea which
has, as we saw, Christian origins. On
the other hand, Aristotle’s account,
predating Christianity by several
centuries, views moral responsibility in
the context of a moral community
seeking to encourage and reinforce
shared standards, where people make
judgments of one another’s character
in the context of their on-going
relationships with one another.
Since belief in heaven and hell is now
rarely thought of, even by many who
consider themselves Christian, one
might suppose that our sympathies
would naturally go to Aristotle’s
account. Yet this is not the case. The
idea of moral responsibility so well
captured in Kant’s philosophy rests on
a powerful notion of moral worth that
continues to have strong intuitive
appeal. Here I want to set out Kant’s
account in more detail, before
suggesting that we can safely give up
some of the intuitions that support his
account of moral responsibility.
The reason why so many people - even
before they come to philosophy - feel
the pull of the free will debate lies in
the idea of moral worth we often
associate with responsibility
attributions like blame. Galen
Strawson expresses the core idea as
follows: ‘if we have [true
responsibility], then it makes sense, at
least, to suppose that it might be just
to punish some with eternal torment
in hell, and reward others with eternal
bliss in heaven’ (1991: viii). Any such
‘ultimate’ merit or demerit is clearly a
matter of strictly individual desert. If it
were merely a matter of chance who
went to heaven or hell - or who would
do so, if those fates really existed -
this would plainly be a matter of mere
fortune. Such intense good or bad luck
would make the world even more
morally arbitrary than it already is. If
such merit is to be fairly allocated,
therefore, it needs to be seen as
something that lies within individuals’
own control. This line of thought, in
turn, relies on what John Skorupski
calls an ‘ideal of pure egalitarian
desert’ (1999: 156). The idea is that we
all equally possess such control, so
that it makes sense to imagine
everybody reaping an equally fair
return on how well we exercise that
control.
The greatest representative of this line
of thought is Kant. For Kant, our moral
worth - the goodness of our will - is
gauged by how sincerely and
persistently we have sought to do our
duty. To do our duty may be much
harder for some people, for instance,
those who have violent passions or
who were brought up with bad habits.
But moral worth is not about results; it
is about the will. We all have such a
will, an ability to choose well, despite
the fact that some of us face stronger
counter-inclinations or more difficult
circumstances. To truly judge a
person’s moral worth involves seeing
past all the obstacles that their will
has faced. Kant argues that this makes
moral worth impossible for us to judge
with any assurance; only God can see
beyond all those things. Kant’s main
concern, though, is how we judge
ourselves. To Kant it’s no problem that
we’re never sure about others’ wills,
and the obstacles or benefits they
have faced. The point is that we can
never be sure of our own motivations:
we must keep trying to do the right
thing, and to do it because it is the
right thing.
But what is ‘the right thing’? What
about those who are morally ignorant?
Kant denies that there is such a thing
as moral ignorance, in that we are all
equally well able to see what we
should do - if only we try. For Kant
‘even the most hardened scoundrel’
would act morally, were it not for the20
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opposing incentives of his inclinations
and desires (Groundwork, 4:454). Kant
has to claim this because otherwise he
would not be able to justify
condemning people who suppose they
are doing the right thing, when in fact
their acts are quite wicked. Adolf
Eichmann, who we mentioned in the
first part of this article, thought he
could justify his actions (ironically,
with a version of Kant’s moral
philosophy!). Yet no one doubts that
he deserved the gravest condemnation
for his crimes, even though many
believe he was sincere in thinking his
acts were defensible. Such examples
show how implausible is the claim to
equal moral knowledge. Even outside
of such extreme cases, people’s
sensitivity to different moral
considerations is highly variable, and
is clearly shaped by up-bringing and
environment. From an Aristotelian
perspective, though, the realities of
moral ignorance and moral
disagreement pose no theoretical
problems. In fact, they provide an
important justification for praise
and blame in terms of
mutual accountability. Responsibility
attributions are important to moral
learning, by communicating how we
have met or failed to meet moral
standards. Because the Kantian
account goes inward, to my scrutiny of
my motives and intentions, it ignores
this crucial educative aspect of
responsibility attributions.
This striving to improve my intentions
is tightly bound up with the idea of
desert. It is a basic and very appealing
intuition of Kant’s ethics that
happiness should correspond to moral
worth - even though in the world we
know this is invariably not the case (at
least so far as we can judge people’s
moral worth at all). For this reason
Kant claims we are rationally and
morally committed to faith in a future
world, where virtue will be rewarded.
(Kant is completely silent on whether
the wicked should also be punished;
again, this relates to his principal
concern, the striving of the self rather
than the judgment of others.) Few
modern Kantians follow Kant in
thinking we must have faith in the
compensatory schema of an after-life.
But many people remain deeply
attached to the idea of a distinctively
moral sort of worth that Kant so
consistently articulated. 
As we have seen, such worth is
measured by the sincere intentions
that are within everyone’s control. This
conception corresponds quite
plausibly to several features of moral
responsibility. We judge the intent
behind people’s actions, rather than
the often haphazard results of our
actions. We take account of people’s
circumstances, and judge less harshly
where these place hard or immoral
pressures on people. We also, quite
often, feel that allowances should be
made for the effects on character of
abusive or deprived upbringings. In
each case, we can interpret these
concessions in Kantian terms - as
drawing a distinction between the
person’s will and the obstacles of
circumstance, thus keeping our moral
evaluation to what is within a person’s
control. There are, however, good
reasons to doubt whether this Kantian
interpretation is really the best
account of these intuitions.
First, it is a commonplace that we
expect people to take responsibility for
things they didn’t intend. This is not
only in those cases where we judge
that someone should have formed
their intentions more carefully.
Certainly we judge the negligent driver
who causes an accident more harshly
than a driver who was careful but
nevertheless caused an accident. But
even in the latter case, we expect
the driver to bear important
responsibilities. (The problem that
many of the things which attract
moral merit and demerit are wholly or
partly outside of individual control is
known to philosophers as the problem
of moral luck. Kantians deny that our
moral worth could ever depend on
luck, whether this is a matter of our
upbringing or the circumstances we
encounter.)
Second, when we are allocating things
on the basis of desert, this is usually
not to do with what the individual
concerned has been able to control.
The usual criterion for a job
appointment is merit, measured in
terms of the demands of the post: on
this basis, the best applicant deserves
to be offered the job. The merits
concerned may be matters outside
anybody’s control, for instance, the
looks of a fashion model, or they may
be only partly related to those
qualities of character that we assume
people have some control over. Why,
then, should control be so important
in allocating ‘moral desert’? (Perhaps it
will be said that it is a defining feature
of moral desert that it relates only to
what is within our control.
Nonetheless, the question remains:
why should we think this to be so?)
Not least, some of the concessions to
circumstances that the Kantian story
permits can be accounted for in quite
different terms. We might take
account of intention, for example,
because an intended action reveals
character especially clearly. But if we
always look back to the will, we face
grave difficulties in accounting for the
moral evaluation of unintended
actions. Just the fact that a person did
not intend to do something may say
something important about her
character. Negligence is a case in
point: the person lacks appropriate
habits of attention. Inconsiderateness
is another. The person does not intend
to be selfish; rather, he fails to form
intentions with regard to the effects
his conduct has on others. In other
words, the Kantian account, being
focussed upon control, stumbles when
a person fails to control herself. An
account based on character, on the
other hand, cares both about a
person’s intentions and the things she
does out of mere habit or inattention.
These are reasons for caution but not
definitive objections to the Kantian
notion of moral worth. One might, for
instance, claim that responsibility in
practice represents a combination of
Kantian and consequentialist
tendencies. We want to be fair to
people’s moral worth, but we also
need to take account of the
consequences of how we allocate
responsibility. Thus we usually
make concessions to intentions,
circumstances, up-bringing in the
name of individuals’ moral worth. But
sometimes we have to be more
concerned with overall results than
individual fairness - for instance in
public systems of punishment and
liability. Here, there might be good
reasons to punish or reward regardless
of inner striving, especially as it is so
difficult to know about a person’s will.
The notion of moral worth central to
Kant’s account is probably what one
writer on ancient Greek ethics - AWH
Adkins - had in mind when he said,
‘We are all Kantians now.’ (1960: 2)
Kant’s idea attractively reconciles two
broad value judgments: (i) the moral
egalitarian idea that all persons are
moral equals by virtue of having
freedom to choose morally; and (ii) the
idea that responsibility relates to
desert, so that people can nonetheless
be judged very differently - some
being blamed for their lives and
characters, others praised. We have
seen that it is not really plausible to
think that people have an equal ability
to choose well. But the deepest
difficulties for a Kantian account turn
on the idea of a moral worth, where
moral responsibility is understood in
terms of a person’s ‘ultimate’ merit.
To begin with, contrast Kant with
Aristotle. Aristotle makes no claims
about a person’s ultimate merit or
demerit. People might be vicious or
virtuous in various ways, and there
might be rare paragons who possess a
comprehensive set of virtues (yes,
these are philosophers!). Naturally we
would not want to associate with the
vicious, and naturally we will want to
condemn their vices in no uncertain
terms. It might help them to learn to
do better, and it may caution others
against them, and it should reinforce
our own and other people’s sense of
what character traits are desirable.
But for Aristotle there is no sense that
the vicious are earning a lasting form
of discredit that should condemn them
in the eyes of an ultimate judge. If the
vicious person were to protest to
Aristotle that the condemnations he
faced were unfair, perhaps because his
character had been formed by his
vicious parents, one suspects Aristotle
would be rather unmoved. Life isn’t
fair, he might say, and we certainly
won’t make it fairer by pretending
some vices are less real because of22
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The idea of worth
their origin in early childhood, let
alone because of their fixity within an
individual’s character. It may be
unpleasant (he might continue) for
you to hear this blame and
condemnation - indeed, I’m glad that
it is, because at least it shows that you
are not so vicious that you don’t care
about others’ opinions of you - but
there are other matters at stake here,
above all the standards and
expectations which regulate all our
lives together.
This line of thought will always be
unsatisfying if we think that our praise
and blame of one another reflect
peculiarly deep truths about people’s
moral deserts - so that there are some
people who are evil and deserve to go
to hell, others who are good and
deserve to go to heaven. But this way
of thinking poses a series of deep
problems.
In the first place, it is very difficult to
know what to make of it within a
secular framework, where religious
faith has become a personal matter. In
particular, why should someone with
no religious faith continue to believe
in this idea of personal moral worth?
We should not forget that there are
several morally disreputable motives
that can make this idea attractive.
Revenge against wrong-doers, or
hatred of them, might be justified by
thinking that they really deserve these
reactions. And Nietzsche made a
famously cynical point: if we think of
ourselves as free, and also see
ourselves as leading good or at least
blameless lives, then we can smugly
take credit for our moral superiority
over others. (Nietzsche was also
rightly indignant at some early
Christian writers, who claimed that
one of the pleasures of heaven would
be looking down on hell and the
tortures of the damned.)
Second, and perhaps more important,
such thinking is incoherent on its own
terms. Ultimate deserts are, precisely,
ultimate: they are for God to judge.
Perhaps a priesthood might be
thought of as having been granted
some provisional right to judge, but
such an idea has become increasingly
unconvincing even to the devout.
Again, an individual concerned with
personal salvation will naturally wish
to scrutinise himself to become
worthy of God’s esteem. But it seems
over-ambitious, to say the least, to
construe our praise and blame of one
another as tentative or fallible
versions of what God will say. (Perhaps
the non-believer could say here: given
that God does not exist, it is our task
to ensure that people get their moral
deserts. To this one can object: (i) As
before, it is not clear why we should
think that this ‘ultimate’ moral desert
exists; (ii) Even if it does, why should
rewarding and punishing it be of
particular concern to us?) Although
Kant’s writings are littered with moral
evaluations of people and their
actions, his theoretical position is that
we are in no position to judge the
worth or deserts of others.
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[Responsibility]
This leads to a third large problem in
thinking in this way: it simply does not
fit with what usually goes on when we
hold one another accountable. In our
resentment or indignation, we might
want to lend our judgments as much
force as possible, and so rely on any
ideas that can lend our mere words
greater authority (‘You deserve to burn
in hell!’). But when we’re not over-
egging the moral pudding, it is plain
that praising and blaming are fairly
mundane practices. Holding each
other responsible assumes that we all
get things wrong in one way or
another, and that for various reasons
some people get things badly wrong,
and that we must - for just these
reasons - seek or reinforce a shared set
of standards and expectations.
Moreover, while we do sometimes
impute good or ill will to people, it is a
childish morality that is preoccupied
with who is ‘good’ and who is ‘bad’:
our mature moral judgments are much
more complex, multivalent and fine-
grained than this.
Why, then, does the ‘moral bank
account’ Feinberg ironically referred
to, the ‘true responsibility’ Galen
Strawson so memorably describes,
continue to hold such sway over our
moral sensibilities?
As we have seen, there is a
distributive aspect to our responsibility
attributions. If something has gone
wrong, and several people have had a
hand in the matter, we often go to
great lengths to assess who bears
what degree of responsibility - who
should make recompense, who should
apologise, or even who should be
punished. At least in part, the question
is certainly: who deserves to be held
accountable? But does this necessarily
point us toward the idea of lasting
moral merit or demerit? The idea of a
stain on our character, when we fail to
acknowledge our guilt, or do
something that cannot be made good,
might support this way of thinking. In
another way, the idea of ‘recompense’
suggests the image of an account,
albeit one we can again make good.
But for both cases a more mundane
explanation is possible: that we judge
something about the character of the
person we are dealing with, from how
they act and how they respond to
others’ responsibility attributions. How
well does he understand the needs and
interests of those around him? What
sort of cooperative relations does it
make sense to pursue with him? What
can we trust him with? Not least, is
this a person who will take and accept
responsibility? (Note, further, that
these things do not form a neat
package: some people might do better
on one count than they do on another
- hence the many different virtues we
ascribe to different people. This point
might reinforce doubts about the
single, ‘ultimate’ evaluation of a
person’s will as good or bad that is so
important to Kant’s account.)
Naturally, to judge such questions we
need to appreciate what pressures
were placed upon a person when he
acted, how he understood the
situation he was responding to, and
special factors affecting his ability to
deliberate and choose. Hence
Aristotle’s concern with force of
circumstances, factual ignorance, and
intoxication, and our more modern
concern with mental illness. But on an
Aristotelian account, the point is that
these factors alter the extent to which
actions reveal the character of the
person. That they undermine the
person’s ‘control’ is true, but
subsidiary. We can see this by
considering how certain forms of bad
character constitute a lack of control
over one’s actions - thus the person
who is weak-willed or indecisive, for
example. Here weak-willed, indecisive
action reveals the person, in a way
that action based on ignorance of the
facts does not. This also makes good
sense of Aristotle’s, and our,
ambivalence about coerced action.
Plainly someone else, the coercer, can
fairly be held responsible for the
coerced person’s deed; and if we were
concerned solely with distributing
responsibility that might be all we
needed to say. But clearly our
judgments do not come to rest so
quickly: we also, habitually, evaluate
the coerced person’s conduct. Should
she have done such and such in
response to such a threat? Was giving
way cowardly or prudent, feeble or
tough-minded?
In other words, distributing one
particular quality, blame or
‘blameworthiness,’ is not our only or
even our real concern in cases of harm
and wrong. In the first place, there is
the judgment of character, which is
not an exercise in distributive fairness.
(When we are judging people in terms
of their fitness and abilities to interact
with others, our concern is extremely
partial: above all, to evaluate those
people who we might continue to
interact with.) Second, the most
important thing to be distributed is
not so much blame but the resulting
responsibilities: who should pay
compensation, apologise, or - in the
case of those who have manifested
the most harmful sorts of
irresponsibility - be punished.
Certainly this exercise is guided by the
distributive ideal of fairness, but only
in part. Practicality, limited
knowledge, and many consequentialist
considerations also play important
roles. Third, as Bernard Williams has24
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Why does the idea of
moral desert continue to
preoccupy us?
[Responsibility]
stressed, an important part of what we
seek in praising and blaming is ‘to
recruit people into a deliberative
community that shares ethical
reasons’ (1995a: 16). Thus when we
blame we demand that someone take
more seriously reasons to think or act
one way rather than another - more
simply, that he takes our reasons to be
his reasons too.
Simplifying both positions, we can say
that what essentially separates
Aristotelians from Kantians here is
whether there is something ‘more’ at
stake in our attributions of blame.
Once character has been judged,
responsibilities distributed and others
encouraged to take on board our
reasons and evaluations, Aristotle’s
story is at an end. From such a
perspective the question is not, ‘How
can people be truly responsible for
their deeds?’ but rather, ‘Why should
a notion of “true responsibility”
continue to preoccupy us?’
The Kantian will feel that something
has been left out. The person whose
character is judged wanting, the
person who should make recompense,
the person who failed to appreciate a
reason to act differently - mustn’t
they have earned the blame if they are
truly to deserve it? And how could we
earn condemnation except by doings
for which we are truly responsible? My
own view, it will be clear, is that we
should resist the temptations of such
an ‘ultimate’ responsibility. We do not
need such a notion to make sense of
how we hold one another responsible
- at least, not of how we hold people
responsible when we are not being
self-righteous or violently indignant.
While one strand of Christianity may
still tempt us to think of the righteous
and of the damned, another embodies
a rather deeper wisdom. Even as a
person holds the wrong-doer
responsible, it is possible to say, ‘There
but for the grace of God go I.’
Ideas about responsibility are usually
presented in terms of a contest
between two positions, compatibilism
and incompatibilism. Incompatibilists
accept the dilemma of free will versus
determinism: responsibility depends
on me controlling my actions, rather
than other causal influences that
operate upon me. Praise, but especially
blame, make no sense if determinism
is true. Compatibilists, on the other
hand, want to insist that the causal
well-orderedness of the universe is,
precisely, compatible with our
responsibility for our actions. But for
most philosophers the question is not
whether responsibility and causal
well-orderedness are compatible, but
how. In other words, to adapt Adkins’s
adage, ‘we are all compatibilists now.’
However, the essential issue for any
compatibilist position lies in the
conception of responsibility it relies on
- and this issue has been much less
well-explored by philosophers than
the metaphysics of freedom and
determinism. I have contrasted two
broad schools of thought that reflect
large aspects of how we put
responsibility into practice. When
Adkins claimed that ‘we are all
Kantians now,’ he was not referring to
Kant’s (incompatibilist) metaphysics
but rather to our tendency to feel that
responsibility attributions must have
depth, that they reflect something
about a person’s ‘real’ deserts. Yet this
position leads us to claims about
control over the self, to the idea of
choices that were ‘really’ our own and
not the result of any external
influence - a position that always
threatens to bring us back to
metaphysical freedom and to
incompatibilism.
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Conclusion
The roughly Aristotelian alternative
sketched here owes much to Bernard
Williams and his critique of a
distinctively modern notion of
‘morality,’ a notion most systematically
expressed in Kant’s philosophy but
also expressed in alternatives such as
utilitarianism. Williams argues that
these ideas neither make sense on
their own terms, nor do they make
sense of what we actually do when we
do engage in attributions of
responsibility. As we have seen,
Aristotle’s account of praise and blame
is based on: (i) how far acts reveal
character; (ii) the fair distribution of
responsibilities to act; and (iii) the
attempt to exchange reasons, share
standards, and maintain relationships
with those whom we judge - and who
judge us in turn. This account involves
no pressure to think of people as
responsible for their acts in any ‘deep’
sense - the sort of deep sense that
would make eternal punishment or
eternal reward intelligible. The basic
facts of compatibilism’s causally well-
ordered world are that we can rely on
no-one to judge such deserts - except
ourselves - and that we can rely on
no-one to mete out such rewards or
punishment - except ourselves. In this
situation we must do our best to relate
to each other as best we can, and do
our best with one another when we do
not relate to others as well as we
might. Fortunately this does not
depend on an untenable idea of ‘true’
responsibility - only that we
encourage people to take
responsibility for their actions, and be
prepared to do the same ourselves.
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Compared with many issues,
philosophers have not written a great
deal on the nature of sexual desire,
and what they have written on it is
has not always been very enlightening.
One reason for this is that
philosophical discussions of sexual
desire have often been fairly heavily
moralised. That is to say, philosophers
and others have often presented a
particular moral conception of sexual
desire as if it were an understanding of
sexual desire as such, thus
distorting our understanding of this
phenomenon (or series of phenomena)
of human life. Certainly, it must be
granted, I think, that it is doubtful that
one can arrive at an account of sexual
desire which is wholly free of moral
concern, but this just means that if we
are aiming to give an account of
sexual desire that is honest and
realistic we should aim to be very
sensitive to the moral notions that we
employ in doing so. In what follows, I
discuss some key philosophical
theories of sexual desire, in which
theories moral concerns are present in
differing ways, and then add some
thoughts of my own.
In my view, the most profound
philosophical account of sexual desire
is that provided by Jean-Paul Sartre in
L’Être et le néant [Being and
Nothingness]. Sartre begins his
discussion of sexual desire by
dismissing the view that sexual desire
is a desire for pleasure. He does so
since he claims that, if such desire
were a desire for pleasure, then it
would be impossible to make sense of
how it is that such desire could come
to ‘attach’ itself to an object, that is,
to another human being. Crudely put,
if desire were desire for pleasure, why
would masturbation not be enough?1
What, then, according to Sartre, does
one want in experiencing sexual
desire? We can approach his
discussion by considering his
reflections on the nature of the caress.
Such a caress - it may be a caress of
the hand or the eye - constitutes, says
Sartre, an attempt to incarnate the
other. 
The other, he says, is born as flesh
under my caress, whence the idea that
I want him or her to be overwhelmed
by his or her body: ‘Desire is the
attempt to strip the body of its
movements as of its clothing and to
make it exist as pure flesh’.2 If the
other responds to my caress then this
person will experience his or her
arousal as ‘troubling’, as ‘clogging’
consciousness. Yet, at the same time,
my experiencing my own desire is felt
by me in the same way, and I, too, in
responding to the caress of the other,
am born as flesh for him or her.
We can put Sartre’s account in this
way. If I desire you, I do not desire your
flesh. Rather, I desire you in your flesh.
It is you I want to exist as flesh for me.
I want to possess you, not as mere
flesh, but through and as revealed in
your flesh. For Sartre, this ‘you’ is your
freedom, for Sartre identifies the self
and freedom. But one does not have to
accept that identification to see the
power of Sartre’s account. We are
embodied creatures, and our
consciousness of that is crucial to our
life. When we share a meal, or walk
together, or talk together, we can only
do so in the way we do because we are
embodied. But if we share a meal with
each other, we are not interested in
one another as embodied. 
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However, if I desire you sexually, then
I am interested in you as embodied.
This is why being the object of sexual
desire can be so compromising:
suddenly to be aware that another
desires one fills one with a
consciousness of one’s being an
embodied creature. One is aware of
one’s flesh as revealing who one is,
and as being the focus of the other’s
interest in one.
For Sartre, the fact that sexual desire
has this kind of structure, i.e., that it is
a desire for a person in his or her flesh,
means that it is doomed to failure.
Remember that, for Sartre, in desire I
want to capture your freedom in your
flesh. But if I manage to possess your
freedom on the surface of your flesh,
then you are, of course, no longer free.
For if I possess your freedom, then I
hold it captive, and, in holding it
captive, it is clearly no longer free.
Thus, if I achieve what I want in my
sexual desire for you, namely,
possessing your freedom, then I have
thereby thwarted or frustrated my
own desire. But you, too, are caught in
the same process in your desire for me:
if you capture me in my freedom, then
I am no longer free, and you have
failed to achieve what you want to
achieve. This means that in our desire
for each other, we are experiencing a
conflict with ourselves and with each
other. We can neither of us get what
we want, and yet in our desire we
struggle to do so. This is why Sartre
claims that orgasm cannot be the aim
of desire.  Rather, orgasm signals the
frustration of desire, since it is, so to
speak, the point at which the failure to
capture the other in his or her flesh
becomes manifest.
Sartre’s account, only the bare bones
of which I have provided here, clearly
captures something central about the
nature of sexual desire. For even if we
do not accept his identification of the
self and freedom, there is, it seems to
me, something right about the idea
that sexual desire is doomed to a
peculiar kind of frustration. Of course,
all of our pleasures can fail to bring
satisfaction: nothing is more common
than to satisfy a desire and remain
unsatisfied oneself. But the point
about sexual desire goes deeper than
this: sexual desire seems in a special or
peculiar way doomed to frustration.
But if that is not, as Sartre in his
account proposes, because of the
identification of self and freedom, why
is it? Here is a suggestion. Sexual
desire seems to be a deeply unstable
desire. On the one hand, it is roving,
largely undiscriminating about the
individuals to whom it attaches itself,
restless: one wants ‘woman’ or ‘man’.
On the other, it can be especially
excited by, and become fixated upon, a
specific individual. This lends sexual
desire a strange fragility: for, in
desiring a given individual, one also
desires him or her as man or woman,
as a representative of the male or the
female sex. There accordingly seems to
be a way in which what one wants in
the sexual act is two things that one
cannot have: one wants this individual
man or woman and one wants all men
or all women. That is, one wants all
men or all women in and through this
one individual. But this is impossible.
And this is perhaps part of the
explanation for the fact that sexual
desire can be so imperious and
desperate. It may also be the reason
why one of the most recurrent sexual
fantasies is that of not knowing who
one’s sexual partner is.
But Sartre’s account seems weak in
one crucial way. He starts, as we have
seen, from the idea that sexual desire
could not be desire for pleasure since
if that were so then we could not
explain how desire attaches itself to
another. But this seems mistaken. The
reason for this is that the pleasure
that comes from sex with another
might simply be more intense or more
varied than the pleasure that comes
from masturbation. We could thus
explain how desire attaches itself to
another by saying that it is this intense
or multifaceted form of pleasure that
is wanted in desire, and that this can
only be satisfied by actually having sex
with another, whence desire attaches
itself to another.
Roger Scruton would disagree with
the last point. He has argued that any
instance of sexual desire possesses an
individualising intentionality. By this
he means that sexual desire is founded
upon the thought of the other as the
specific individual he or she is.3 That is,
there can be no sexual desire which
exists and then ‘attaches’ itself to a
specific individual. Hence, according
to this account, if a man desires two
women at the same time, he will be
experiencing two different desires,
each of which will be a desire for one
of the two women. From this account
it also follows that there cannot be
any such sexual desire as an
unfocused desire for no particular man
or woman. Scruton considers the case
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of the sailor storming ashore with the
thought ‘woman’ in his mind: he might
be thought to desire a woman, but no
particular woman. Scruton claims that
this is not so: until the sailor actually
meets a specific woman he desires, he
desired no woman; he was rather in
the condition of desiring to desire.4
Such a view of sexual desire has to
find an adequate response to such
phenomena as that of Casanova,
described by Stefan Zweig:
His passion, flowing away at the
purely erotic level, knows nothing
of the ecstasy of uniqueness. We
need have no anxiety, therefore,
when he seems reduced to despair
because Henriette or the beautiful
Portuguese lady has left him. We
know that he will not blow out his
brains; nor are we surprised to find
him, a day or two later, amusing
himself in the first convenient
brothel. If the nun C.C. is unable to
come over from Murano, and the
lay-sister M.M. arrives in her place,
Casanova is speedily consoled. After
all, one woman is as good as
another!5
Scruton writes: ‘If John is frustrated
in his pursuit of Mary, there is
something inapposite in the advice
“Take Elizabeth, she will do just as
well.”’6 Not, apparently, if one is
Casanova! It seems, then, that
Scruton has two options. Either he
could insist that he has provided a
true account of sexual desire, in
which case Zweig has totally
misunderstood and misdescribed
the case of someone like Casanova,
and, indeed, that a lot of what looks
like sexual desire where what is
desired is someone or other is not
really sexual desire after all since it
does not display an individualising
intentionality; or he could say that
such cases display sexual desire all
right, but in a perverted or
otherwise morally unacceptable
form. In fact, Scruton seems to
waver between the two, for,
although, as we have seen, he
claims that in cases such as that of
the sailor the man in question
experiences no sexual desire until
he comes into contact with the
woman he desires, he also grants,
at the end of his book, and looking
over his argument as a whole, that
‘my analysis has included a large
prescriptive component’.7 In other
words, he seems to concede that
his analysis is not an analysis of
sexual desire as such but a moral
view about the best form that
sexual desire can take. It is, in other
words, a moralised account of
sexual desire.
I do not think, then, that Scruton’s
account is wholly plausible as it
stands. However, it seems to me clear
that what Scruton is trying to do is to
give an account of sexual desire that
does justice to the fact that there can
be deeper and shallower expressions
of such desire. Indeed, it seems to be
the case that many people long for
their sexual desire to be provided with
deeper forms of expression. But some
accounts of sexual desire do not seem
to be able to make sense of this. One
such is that provided by Igor
Primoratz, who has argued that sexual
desire ‘is sufficiently defined as the
desire for certain bodily pleasures,
period’.8 The reason that such an
account of sexual desire makes it hard
to see how such desire is capable of
finding deeper forms of expression in
human life is that it assimilates sexual
desire to something like the desire to
scratch an itch, and the possibilities of
a deepened understanding of itch-
scratching are severely limited, to say
the least. This is not to say that only
deepened forms of expression of
sexual desire are morally legitimate, or
anything like that: it is merely to say
that any account of sexual desire must
be able to make sense of the
possibility of those deeper forms of
expression.
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In any case, Primoratz’ account of
sexual desire has some odd
consequences. It leads, he argues, to
the conclusion that any putative
sexual act which is devoid of pleasure
for the person engaged in that act is
not, after all, a sexual act at all. Thus
he claims that a prostitute who gains
no pleasure from intercourse with a
customer is not engaged in a sexual
act (whereas the customer is). Further:
As for the couple who have lost
sexual interest in each other but
still engage in routine coitus, the
less pleasurable it gets, the less
valuable it is as sex. If, at some
point, it becomes utterly bereft of
sexual pleasure, would it be so odd
to say that they were performing
acts that for most people ordinarily
involve at least a modicum of
sexual pleasure, but that they were
merely going through the motions,
that for them there was no sex in it
any longer?9
One might suspect that Primoratz is
not, after all, just trying to tell us what
sex is, but prescribing a particular
form of it, that is, one through which
one experiences as much pleasure as
possible. For he clearly believes that
the less pleasurable sex is, the less
valuable it is. Still, leaving that aside,
it does, surely, seem odd to suppose
that the bored couple in Primoratz’
example are not actually engaged in a
sexual act. One might as well say that
what it is to feel hunger is to have a
desire for certain bodily pleasures so
that if one eats something utterly
bland which fails to fill the stomach
(modern mass-produced strawberries,
for example) one is not really eating at
all.
In fact, I do not think that Primoratz
need deny on his account that the
prostitute or the bored couple are
engaged in sex even if they get no
pleasure from such acts. His view
expresses a confusion between sexual
desire and sexual acts. One is, after all,
still eating if there is no pleasure in
doing so. The prostitute might not,
indeed, possess any sexual desire for
her clients, but it does not follow from
that that she is not engaged in sexual
acts with them. The same may be the
case for the bored couple. In the same
way, I might for some reason have no
hunger, no desire for food, yet still be
eating. 
So far, then, we have seen that three
key philosophical theories of sexual
desire have weaknesses, though I
certainly would not deny that they
each capture some part of the truth
about some individuals’ experience of
sexual desire. But if we were to try to
find some fundamental reason why
they are not complete as accounts of
sexual desire, why they do not do
enough to open up a deepened
understanding of sexual desire, then I
think that we would have to note that
central here is that none of them
makes anything of the connection
between sexual desire and
procreation. And we can see that this
connection is crucial by the simple
reflection that a species of creature
which had all our experiences of
sexual desires but in whom sexual
desire had no connection with
procreation would have a profoundly
different understanding of sexual
desire from the one we have. As so
often in philosophy, the real problem is
to find a helpful way of expressing this
point.
At one point D. H. Lawrence writes:
Sex is the balance of male and
female in the universe, the
attraction, the repulsion, the transit
of neutrality, the new attraction,
the new repulsion, always different,
always new. The long neuter spell of
Lent, when the blood is low, and the
delight of the Easter kiss, the sexual
revel of the spring, the passion of
mid-summer, the slow recoil, revolt,
and grief of autumn, greyness
again, then the sharp stimulus of
long winter nights. Sex goes
through the rhythm of the year, in
man and woman, ceaselessly
changing: the rhythm of the sun in
his relation to the earth.10
It goes without saying that many, if
not most, do not share this view of
sex, wonderful though it is. And there
are lots of ways in which one might
pursue or develop or respond to the
thoughts Lawrence articulates. For our
purposes what is important is that
Lawrence connects sex to the natural
cycle of life, and does so in such a way
as to express a sense of the wonder
and mystery of sex. But if we ask
ourselves how it is possible to see sex
in this way, then I think that we shall
not be able long to resist the thought
that it is the fact that sex is related to
conception and procreation that
allows us to do this. For it is this fact
about it which most immediately and
forcefully connects it to the notions of
corruption and regeneration and
hence allows it to be brought into
contact with our sense of the natural
cycle of the seasons. And if, as we do,
we can wonder at that cycle, at its
utter familiarity together with the
strangeness that each spring green
shoots sprout from what looks like
dead wood, we can also see why it is
that we can wonder at sex, at the
strangeness of a force at once so
familiar and yet unheimlich - this
incomparable German word, which
means ‘uncanny’ or ‘spooky’ or
‘frightening’, captures the sense of
something’s not being like that which
one meets with at home [Heim], that
which is unfamiliar or upsets one’s
ingrained and habitual ways of dealing
with things.
We could perhaps get at the
significance of procreation for an
understanding of sexual desire in
another way. Many people experience
a sense of wonder and mystery at the
birth of a child. And this very sense
can cast in a certain light the sexual
act which directly led to this birth, can
remind us of the strangeness and
mystery of sex. But to speak here of a
reminder is not to suggest that anyone
might actually have forgotten
anything, for we are all familiar with
the fact that sexual desire has its own
demands and needs which well up and
grip us in ways we cannot fully
fathom, and that it attaches us to
people in ways we cannot properly
comprehend. We all know that sex,
where what is craved is so clear and
yet weirdly elusive, seems at once
completely natural and an intrusion
from another world into our daily
activities. 
The issue is rather that of such
knowledge becoming deeper and more
alive as an object of wonder in a
person, much as, say, suffering but
surviving a dreadful accident might be
said to remind one of one’s mortality.
Thus the connection with sex of
reproduction and all it involves casts
its shadow over sex in the kind of way
that mortality casts its shadow over
human life. And this is so even if a
given person never thinks of
procreation (except, perhaps, to
prevent his or her sexual acts leading
to conception), just as it is so even if a
person never thinks of his own
mortality (except to suppress or
ridicule the thought). For the kinds of
thoughts I have said people have
about the birth of a child and those
that people have who have survived
death form part of the collective
experience of mankind, of the wisdom
concerning what it is to be a human
being and thus of our sense of who
and what we are.
I am not claiming, of course, that
reflection on the connection of sex
with reproduction is the only way in
which it is possible for one to come to
a deepened understanding of human
sexuality. I am just saying that it is a
central or permanent way in which
this can happen for creatures such as
we are, and thus that any account of
sexual desire which leaves it out must
be inadequate.
As I have already said, however, it does
not follow from the fact that sexual
desire is capable of deeper forms of
expression that only such expression
of sexual desire is morally legitimate.
Moreover, it is often extremely unclear
just which kinds of expression of
sexual desire are shallow and which
deep. Thus Stefan Zweig, from whose
essay on Casanova I have already
quoted, manages in that essay to
celebrate the very shallowness of
Casanova’s erotic life, finding in it
much to envy in its freedom from
moral concerns and in its full-blooded
impulsiveness. Yet Zweig would
certainly not have supposed it to be
good that all behave as Casanova did.
It is possible to celebrate the sheer
variety of forms of expression of
human sexual desire whilst being glad
that they remain that, a variety, and
that none establishes a hegemony
over the others.
Sexual desire, then, I am arguing, is
interestingly balanced between depth
and shallowness. There is, perhaps, a
reason for this in that located close to
the centre of our experience of sexual
desire is, oddly enough, that of
disgust. 
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In a valuable essay, David Pole has
analysed the concept of disgust.11 He
argues, as have others, that disgust
always carries a charge of attraction:
those things we find disgusting we
find both repellent and attractive. Pole
also suggests that we get our central
notion of disgust from organic matter
that is decomposing in some way,
which would help explain why such
things as slugs - to take one of Pole’s
examples - are experienced as
disgusting: for the slug’s slimy body,
which it appears to be losing as it
crawls along, seems to be caught in a
process of decay and corruption. One
of the most disgusting things I have
ever seen was the neck of an
otherwise healthy horse, gashed wide
open by barbed wire, into which had
buried themselves thousands of
maggots which were feeding on the
blood oozing in clots from the wound.
A friend told me of his disgust on
seeing a frog which has a loose back
like a string vest into which the young
flee to seek shelter and are carried for
safety. Organic decay, then, or what
looks like it, or smells of it, is perhaps
the core of disgust.
Consider now the sexual act. In this
act the bodies of those involved
undergo profound changes: the
flushing of the face, the erection of
the penis, the tumescence of the
nipples, the secretions of the vagina.
One is overwhelmed in desire by one’s
body, as Sartre puts it: one’s will is
here in abeyance. All of these things
can, of course, be received as an
expression of excitement. But there is
no doubt that they can be seen as
disgusting, and often have been so
seen: I should imagine that
Christianity has been particularly good
at finding them disgusting. For, by
their very nature, and in their triumph
over the will, they are redolent of a
body in decay. This is why desire for
the other in his or her flesh can so
easily, in certain persons, tip over into
disgust with his or her flesh. And in
sexual jealousy such disgust is to the
fore: for the sexually exciting
transformations of the beloved’s body
resemble nothing so much as the
disgusting decay of that body when
they are provoked by, and
express desire for, a rival. Yet the
transformations of one’s beloved’s
body, even when they are connected
with one’s rival, remain exciting, and
they do so even partly because they
disgust, for that which is disgusting is
appealing, as we have already noted.
Disgust, one might say, adapting a
Sartrean idiom from another context,
lies coiled like a worm at the heart of
desire, and it is brought to the light of
day by betrayal. Sexual jealousy may
begin in the recognition of one’s
dispensability as a sexual partner, but
once it has been evoked it feeds upon
the primordial disgust which lies
hidden in all sexual acts. 
It might be said that the idea that
disgust lies at the heart of sexual
desire is absurd. And it is, of course,
true that not everyone will be
susceptible to the sense that the
transformations of the body in sexual
excitement are redolent of a body in
decay, however latent this might be.
But there are other reasons for
supposing that disgust is inherent in
sexual desire. For example, it just
seems to be the case that sexual desire
(especially male desire?) is often
ignited and intensified by a sense of
doing something which involves
disgust. This is connected with the fact
that in sex we suspend or overcome
our normal sense of disgust. As
William Ian Miller says:
[S]exual desire depends on the idea
of a prohibited domain of the
disgusting. A person’s tongue in
your mouth could be experienced
as a pleasure or as a most repulsive
and nauseating intrusion
depending on the state of relations
that exist or are being negotiated
between you and the person. But
someone else’s tongue in your
mouth can be a sign of intimacy
because it can also be a disgusting
assault.12
But can it be right to say that modern
sexual desire, whose expression is so
free in comparison with that of
previous ages, carries a sense of
disgust at its core? Perhaps the idea is
not as absurd as it might seem, for A.
Béjin has argued that 
present day [sexual] norms tend to
provoke a conflict between
immediate surrender to the
demands of the senses, and an
increased conscious mastery of
the organic processes... One must...
abandon oneself to sensation,
without ceasing to submit one’s
actions to a rational calculation of
‘sexual expedience’.13
The claim is that we have done a great
deal to subsume our sexual practices
under the same kind of cost-benefit
calculus that applies in so many other
areas of our life. If this is right, then32
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modern sexual desire, for all its
seeming liberation from older forms of
control, may be thought to express a
powerful asceticism which itself
testifies to a sense of disgust with sex.
Indeed, the fact that modern people
seem obsessed with a kind of highly
stylised, more or less ‘pornographized’
sex is itself perhaps a sign of a kind of
unacknowledged disgust for sex, a
disgust for sex that cannot be
packaged and presented in a highly
sanitized form. 
I have spoken, then, of the possibility
of a deepened understanding of sex
and of the disgust which is implicit in
sex. These two ways of thinking can
certainly pull us in different directions,
making us think of sex as now
something full of grace and light, now
as something mean and shabby. But
they can pull in the same direction. For
the experience of sex can be deeply
consoling. If we ask why this is so,
then a key part of the answer is surely
that, given the wretchedness of the
human heart and its potential to fill
one with disgust, it can seem little
short of a miracle that one person
should consent to the intimacy with
another that making love involves. In
other words, in some moods it can
seem that when two people make love
this act will depend upon, and involve,
mutual forgiveness. 
Responding to such a thought, some
have seen in sex the possibility of a
quasi-religious act, as John Berryman
suggests in one of his poems: ‘Our
Sunday morning when dawn-priests
were applying/Wafer and wine to the
human wound, we laid/Ourselves to
cure ourselves down...’. Such an idea is
certainly blasphemous, but it helps us
see that, in an age of decay of
religious belief, there may lie secretly
in the modern obsession with sex
something more than I have already
suggested: a kind of longing for a
redemption no longer available in
traditional terms.
There is, for some people, something
melancholy in the fact that sex can be
both a source of the kind of
consolation I have mentioned, as well
as being imperious and desperate in
the way I have also mentioned. We
often long for it to express only the
most tender of feelings. Yet one can
also be glad of this discrepancy in our
experience of what sex is, since it
makes of sex one of those mysteries of
the human condition which help us
hold on to the sense that life is worth
living because what it offers us is
inexhaustibly rich and varied.
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It has just turned seven o’clock on a
cold and wet November morning. You
know it has just turned seven o’clock
because your alarm clock has sounded.
You have to get up to get ready for
college because you can’t pretend to
have fallen ill so soon after your last
bout of sickness. You find yourself
thinking that, what with it being only
seven o’clock, there’s plenty of time
and that it can’t hurt to spend just
another couple of minutes in bed. How
can two paltry minutes matter? Who
could deprive anyone of little more
than a hundred seconds of extra
warmth and comfort on a morning like
this?
I’d be prepared to bet that you’ve
reasoned in this way at least once or
twice in your life. We are all very
willing to tell ourselves that an extra
minute won’t matter, that an extra
few pence is of no importance and
that an extra few chips will make no
difference to our waistlines. We know
that people have been thinking in this
way for a very long time. The biblical
patriarch Abraham tries to use the
insignificance of small differences
when arguing with nothing less than
God. Yet it is with an ancient Greek
philosopher called Eubulides that
many people find the start of a deep
philosophical puzzle that such
reasoning can produce. Eubulides was
famous for having seven riddles, which
sound like brain-teasers, but which
when analysed prove to be of more
than coffee-break interest. Two of
these are known as the paradox of the
heap and the paradox of the bald man.
We shall take a look at the first and
return to the second in a moment.
I hope you will agree that if I arrange
them in the right way, a million and
one grains of sand can make up a heap
of grains of sand.1 I hope you will also
agree that a single grain of sand does
not make up a heap. I put a heap-
shaped one million and one grain
before you and a single grain behind
you. Your task is to remove a grain at
random and throw it onto the sand
behind you. You are to repeat the task
one million times until you have a
single grain before you.
It’s tempting to think that the addition
or subtraction of a single grain can’t
make a difference to whether
something is a heap or not in the same
way that the addition of just two
minutes to your morning lie-in doesn’t
really matter. Heaps and lie-ins, we
may say, tolerate small alterations. We
shall call this tempting thought the
tolerance thought.
Let’s now present matters formally. An
argument is a collection of sentences
we call the premises alongside a
sentence we call the conclusion. The
premises we assume are true. An
argument is a good or valid argument
if there is a logical path from the
premises to the conclusion. Let’s put
this thought and the two we opened
with as the premises of an argument.
(1) 1,000,001 grains make up a heap
(2) 1 grain does not make up a heap
(3) The removal of 1 grain does not 
turn a heap into something that 
is not a heap
(or vice versa).
What conclusion can we draw? Each
time you remove a grain from the
heap, you preserve the heap because
of (3). Each time you add a grain to the
‘non-heap’ collection behind you, you
still have a non-heap, also because of
(3). Even after a million subtractions
to the heap before you therefore,
when just one grain remains, you still
have a heap:
(4) 1 grain makes up a heap.
Similarly, after a million additions to
the non-heap behind you, you have a
1,000,001 non-heap:
(5) 1,000,001 grains don’t make up a 
heap.
We can therefore deduce, by
combining (2) with (4) and (1)
with (5):
(6) 1 grain makes up a heap and 1 
grain doesn’t make up a heap.
(7) 1,000,001 grains make up a heap 
and 1,000,001 grains don’t make 
up a heap.34




The Paradox Of The Heap
Two sentences present a contradiction
if they both cannot be true together
and they both cannot be false
together. For example, the sentences
‘John is at home’ and ‘John is not at
home’ present a contradiction, if we
understand them literally as talking
about the same John. A paradox is an
argument whose conclusion presents a
contradiction. (6) and (7) both present
contradictions. Our argument is a
paradox: the paradox of the heap.
You should be able to see that the
same argument can prove that 2
grains do and do not make up a heap,
that 3 grains do and do not...that any
number indeed do and do not. This is
clearly unacceptable.
Our conclusion is the product of the
premises and the logical reasoning we
used to move forward from them. If
we can’t accept the conclusion of an
argument, it is with either or both of
these factors that we must find fault. 
It often happens that we are tripped
up by an argument that looks and feels
logically valid but which turns out to
be more complex than we think and
conceals logical blunders. Yet this
argument really just uses one logical
principle.
The first principle we rely on is called
modus ponendo ponens or (usually)
just modus ponens for short. The
principle says:
(MP)  From [A] and [if A then B] 
deduce [B]
For example: from [it is raining] and [if
it is raining, then Bernard will be at
home] we can deduce [Bernard will be
at home].
Modus ponens is the cornerstone of
reasoning. It captures the idea of
conditional judgement or reasoning or
action, without which neither we, nor
any other creature capable of the most
basic of thoughts, could do anything.
It therefore seems we can’t reject it
here.
Modus ponens allows us to deduce
[1,000,000 grains of sand make up a
heap] from [If 1,000,001 grains make
up a heap then 1,000,000 grains make
up a heap] and [1,000,001 grains make
up a heap]. The conditional there is
just an instance of our tolerance
thought. By repeating the reasoning,
we reach (4): 1 grain makes up a heap.
(2) and (4) present a contradiction.
Formally, we can join them together to
come up with the sentence: 1 grain of
sand doesn’t make up a heap and 1
grain of sand makes up a heap. In so
doing, we use another logical
principle, called conjunction
introduction. A conjunction is just a
sentence of the form [A and B]. The
principle says:
(Conj I) From [A] and [B], deduce [A 
and B]
This should seem too obvious to merit
either denial or comment. We shall
therefore conclude that the reasoning
is not at fault.
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Reasoning
It must therefore be one or more of
the premises. When we are faced with
premises all of which seem true, we
need to think of what it would mean if
they each weren’t true and which of
these situations would be the least
unacceptable. If (1) were not true,
then 1,000,001 grains would not make
up a heap. I chose this number
thinking that that many grains could
be formed into a heap. I hope you’ll
think that, if I am wrong, then some
large number of grains could be made
into a heap. If we deny (1), therefore,
we are in effect denying that any
number of grains could make up a
heap - or, more simply, that there are
heaps. Similarly, if (2) were not true,
we’d be in effect denying that any
number of grains could fail to make up
a heap. 
Either denial seems impossible. It is
however as close to an axiom in
philosophy as anything is that there is
no position on a problem, however
crazy, that no-one has not chosen to
adopt. It so happens that a couple of
philosophers have defended the
thought that (1) is false. The idea is
that the paradox shows our vague
words to be so defective that they
don’t truly apply to anything. Nor
could they apply to any possible thing.
It is rather as if ‘heap’ simply isn’t fit
to be applied to things in the same
way that ‘red’ isn’t fit to be applied
numbers. In saying that ‘three isn’t
red’, we aren’t saying that it is some
other colour. Numbers don’t have
colours. Similarly, collections of
material objects can’t be made into
heaps.
Most people regard this view as both
nonsensical and desperate. Even if we
allowed that nothing really is a heap,
then plenty of things look like heaps or
are heaps according to how we use
that word. You should be able to see
that these expressions are just as
vague as ‘heap’ is. It therefore follows
that nothing even looks like a heap.
Now we may be wrong about whether
someone is tall because appearances
are misleading. Yet whether someone
looks tall just depends on appearances
- indeed, how things appear to us
individually. Generalising, if we allow
that ‘looks X’ doesn’t apply to
anything, where X is replaced with any
vague expression, it seems that we
can’t even describe how things seem.
Yet we can surely do this at least. Even
Descartes allowed that we couldn’t be
fooled about our most basic
appearances.
Almost all philosophers think that the
problem lies with the third premise. In
order to explain why, it’ll be worth
looking at the puzzle from a different
angle.
It is often said that not everything is
black and white. An action may not be
clearly good or clearly bad but be good
in some respects and bad in others. An
accusation may neither be wholly true
nor wholly false. An expression may
neither clearly apply nor clearly fail to
apply. For example, you can probably
think of someone who you wouldn’t
call tall but of whom you couldn’t
really say that he isn’t tall. He’s
somewhere in the middle. He’s what
we call a borderline case of tall.
If you took someone who was tall and
gradually shrank them, then you’d find
yourself with a borderline case of tall
before finding yourself sometime later
with someone not tall. Similarly, if you
took something that was a heap and
removed grains one at a time, you’d be
faced with borderline cases of heaps
before non-heaps. Heap and tall are
alike in being vague. They allow for
borderline cases. They invite the
tolerance thought. Although we
haven’t formally spelled out the
paradox for tall, it is not hard to do. Do
you think a difference of a millimetre
matters to whether someone is tall or
not? If not, then by shrinking a person
two metres in height by a millimetre
at a time, you can end up with a
person one metre tall that is still tall.
An expression such as eighteen years
of age or more is one that we can
regard as sharp. You are either
eighteen years of age or more or you
are not. The age of eighteen is a sharp
boundary that separates these two
possibilities. The thought is that heap
and tall are vague just because there is
no such sharp boundary. If there were
a sharp boundary for tall, then there
would be some exact height above
which people were tall. If there were,
then someone a millimetre below this
height and therefore not tall would
become tall by growing a millimetre.
This contradicts the tolerance thought.
The fact that we are tempted by
tolerance shows that we don’t like this
idea of a sharp boundary. Indeed, we
think that there are instead borderline
cases, which replace this sharp line
with a middle region.
Let us now return to the third premise.
It says that a small change of a grain
can’t turn a heap into a non-heap. If
this were false, wouldn’t it mean that
a small change could turn a heap into
a non-heap? It seems not. This would
only be so if we think that there were
two possibilities: heap and non-heap.
No small change can turn a heap into
a non-heap just because there are lots
of borderline heaps in between. We
can therefore say that the third
premise isn’t true without this
committing us to a heap/non-heap
sharp boundary.
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Any expression that allows for
borderline cases and the tolerance
thought is vague. We’ve seen that
heap and tall are vague. Eubulides
invited also to think that by pulling
one hair out of the head of a non-bald
man, you couldn’t make him bald. You
should be able to construct a paradox
using this tolerance thought along the
above lines. Such paradoxes are called
sorites paradoxes after the greek word
for ‘heap’.2
The ingredients needed to generate
these puzzles are simple. You need to
think of a dimension of change, such
as numbers of grains or numbers of
hairs. At one end of this dimension, we
find things that are X. At the other, we
find things that are NOT-X. All we add
now is the tolerance thought: that
small differences don’t matter.
Here are some examples to get you
thinking. Heights, weights, distances,
times, temperatures are all dimensions
of change. If a person is two metres in
height they are tall and if one metre
they are not tall. Yet can growing by a
millimetre make someone tall who
was not-tall? You should be able to
generate similar puzzles for short,
heavy, light, near, far, hot, warm and
cold. Now think of any expression for
which number is relevant. Alongside
heap and bald we have crowd (number
of people), fleet (number of ships) and
many, few, lots, some, plenty (number
of whatever is counted). Time is also a
dimension of change. 
It seems odd to say that the passing of
a second can make something old that
wasn’t before, along with making a
creature an adult of its species if it
wasn’t before. Finally, take any
everyday material object, such as a
coffee cup. It is made up of a large
number of molecules. If I remove a
very small number at random, I surely
can’t destroy the object by turning it
into something no longer a coffee cup.
The same is therefore true of any of
the things that populate our
environment - including ourselves. If
you can tolerate the loss of a few
molecules, then you do and don’t
exist!
Philosophers distinguish different
types of vagueness. One type with
which sorites vagueness is often
confused is what I shall
call ‘comparison-class vagueness’.
Suppose I tell you something has a
height of ten metres and I ask you
whether it is tall or not. You can’t
answer until you know what sort of
thing it is. A ten-metre tall man is very
tall. A ten-metre building is not tall. A
ten-metre tree may be tall, depending
on the species. It can therefore be
vague whether something is tall just
because it may be vague what sort of
thing we’re using as the basis for
making our comparative judgements.
This sort of vagueness is not at all the
same thing as sorites vagueness. Once
we have agreed that the thing is a
beech tree and that it is indeed tall, we
still generate a paradox for ‘tall beech
tree’ via the tolerance thought that if
a tall beech tree shrinks by a
millimetre, it is still tall.
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What Vagueness Is
and Isn’t
A third and similar form of vagueness
is informational vagueness. You want
to meet Anna for lunch. You ask me
where she is. I tell you that she is in
London. This information is very likely
to be too vague to be of much use.
What you wanted was her precise
location. On the other hand, if you
know that Anna only ever has lunch in
one restaurant when she is in London,
then my telling you that is in London
rather than Paris will suffice.
Information is vague or precise
dependent on the use we intend to put
it to.
The sentence ‘Jupiter is a bigger planet
than Mars’ is true. Another, more
formal way of putting it, is that the
sentence has the truth-value true. In
the same way, we can say that the
sentence ‘Mars is a bigger planet than
Saturn’ has the truth-value false.
So far, we have spoken as if these are
the only two values a sentence can
have. We believe that it is true that
1,000,001 grains make a heap. What
about 1,000,000 grains? Either the
sentence ‘1,000,000 grains make a
heap’ is true or false. If false, then a
sharp boundary divides these two
collections into heap and non-heap.
Our tolerance thought says that the
sentence is true, just because one
grain can’t make a difference. But this
generates a paradoxical conclusion.
We recently found a way through the
dilemma: we admit borderline cases.
At the level of truth, this translates
into adding a third truth-value:
borderline or indefinite. It may then
be, for example, that ‘34,346 grains
make a heap’ is indefinite just because
they make up a borderline heap.
If we turn back to the formal
argument, we are saying that (1) and
(2) are true and that (3) isn’t. Should
we say that (3) is indefinite or false?
(3) The removal of 1 grain does not 
turn a heap into something that is
not a heap
(or vice versa).
One generalised and clear way of 
re-expressing (3) is as follows:
(3’) If a collection of x grains 
makes up a heap, then a collection
of x-1 grains makes up a heap.
We might think as follows. (3)’ says
something untrue, that is, false,
namely that ‘heap’ continues to apply,
no matter how few grains remain. This
doesn’t mean that we have a sharp
borderline. We interpose the
borderline cases.
Unfortunately, we can’t say that - at
least, not so quickly. It is not possible
to explain here in detail why. You will
remember that earlier we looked at
two principles (MP) and (Conj I). These
seem to capture some of the meaning
of our everyday logical words ‘if’ and
‘and’. It happens that, if we say that (3)
or (3’) must be false, we end up forced
to challenge the logical principles we
hold for these words and others like
‘or’, ‘not’, ‘all’ and ‘some’. It turns out
that making (3) or (3’) false is too high
a price to pay.
So we must hold that (3) and (3’) are
indefinite. What does this mean? One
thought would be: it’s indefinite
because it depends on the number of
grains. But this still implies that, for at
least one x, if a collection of x grains
makes up a heap, then a collection of
x-1 grains makes up a heap, which we
don’t want. A second thought would
be: it’s indefinite because we can’t tell.
But this makes the problem one of
knowledge: it may be that the removal
of a grain can turn a heap into a non-
heap but we can’t be aware of this.
This isn’t any more tempting.
We can in fact defend the thought
that it is indefinite from a logical point
of view and that this doesn’t translate
into anything ‘intuitively’ obvious in
everyday English. Yet you might think
that (3) and (3’) are better described as
not indefinite, not true nor false, but
nearly true. Can we make sense of
this?
Some philosophers think that there are
far more than three truth-values. Alan
and Bill are 1.67m and 1.68m tall
respectively. They are both borderline
tall. It is indefinite whether they are
tall or not. Yet Bill is taller than Alan
by a small amount and so it should be
possible to say that it is truer that Bill
is tall than Alan is tall. 
We can distinguish many degrees of
tallness, of baldness, of redness, and
so on. Indeed, every vague expression
X generates a meaningful expression
‘...is more/less X than...’. We should
therefore have as many degrees of
truth as we can have degrees to which
these expressions apply. Between the
numbers 1.67 and 1.68 are infinitely
many numbers. We should therefore
admit infinitely many truth-values.
Even if there aren’t infinitely many
degrees of being a heap, it will be
better to have too many truth-values
which we can group together than to
have too few.
As far as the paradox is concerned, a
very neat reply becomes possible. I
shall leave out the technical details
and try to convey the essence. It is
true that 1,000,001 grains make a
heap. It is slightly less true that
1,000,000 grains make a heap. It is
slightly less true again that 999,999
grains make a heap. It is false that 138




grain makes a heap. Our premise (3)
tells us that it is true that if x has n
grains and is a heap, then x’ with n-1
is a heap. We can say that this is
nearly true but not quite true. What is
quite true is that if if x has n grains
and is a heap, then x’ with n-1 is a
heap to a slightly lower degree. We
confuse these two thoughts. If we
admit that (3) is almost but not quite
true, it becomes possible once again to
defuse the paradox. This is better than
saying it is simply ‘indefinite’.
Those who defend alternative logics
consider vagueness to be a semantic
problem. They think that words like
heap and tall have meanings that are
incomplete. Heap is defined in such a
way that some things fall under the
definition - the clear cases of heaps.
The definition equally excludes some
things - the clear cases of non-heaps.
The borderline status of a borderline
case reflects a real and profound
absence of truth or falsity stemming
from the definition not covering such
cases.
An alternative and radical proposal is
that vagueness does not arise from
incomplete meanings but from our
knowledge of meaning. It is not
semantic (to do with meaning) but
epistemic (to do with knowledge). The
Epistemicist tells us that every vague
expression is semantically precise. In
other words, there is a sharp boundary
dividing heaps from non-heaps, tall
people from non-tall people, and so
on. We simply don’t know where this
boundary is. Furthermore, we can’t
know.
In order to explain why, let us examine
the concept of knowledge. We say
things like ‘Bernard knows that we are
meeting this evening at 8pm’. We can
break this down into three parts: a
subject (Bernard), a propositional
attitude (knowing that) and a
proposition (we are meeting this
evening). For our purposes, we can
think of a proposition as like a
sentence about which it makes sense
to ask: is it true or false? By way of
comparison, if I say ‘Bernard knows
how to drive a car’, we have an
attitude - knowing how - but not a
propositional one, as it does not make
sense to ask whether ‘to drive a car’ is
true or false.
Our ‘attitude’ to the proposition ‘we
are meeting this evening’ may be one
of knowledge but also one of belief,
desire, fear or hope, amongst others.
An attitude is something like a way a
mind relates to information. Alongside
knowledge, we have the closely-
related attitude of belief. The essential
differences between belief and
knowledge are as follows. Firstly, you
can believe something false but you
can’t know something false. It is
possible to say ‘Until I was eight, I
believed New York was the capital of
America’ but not ‘Until I was eight, I
knew New York was the capital of
America’. Secondly, knowledge is more
‘robust’ or reliable than a true belief. I
ask you whether Bernard was at home
yesterday and you reply, ‘I believe he
was’. If I ask, ‘are you sure?’ it would be
fair for you to say, ‘no’. You have some
grounds to believe he was at home but
you may not be supremely confident.
If you reply, ‘I know he was’, then you
advertise your confidence. When we
want to find things out, we tend to
search for people who know, rather
than simply believe.
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Epistemicism 
Consider now the following situation. I
am at a football stadium in which
there are 74,362 people, including me.
I guess how many people there are and
I guess that there are 74,362. Now you
will agree that, even though I am
right, I don’t know that there are
74,362. I am right by chance. I haven’t
done anything, such as count the
people, to make my lucky guess into a
robust piece of knowledge. Indeed,
had there been a few hundred more
people, I could have just as easily
guessed, wrongly, that there were
74,362 people because it would have
looked no different to me. I may not be
able to have exact knowledge of the
number of people in the stadium but I
can have inexact knowledge. I can
know that there are at least 2 and not
more than 1,000,000 people in the
stadium just by looking because these
two situations look sufficiently
different from the actual one for
someone with my capacities for
discrimination. If I had a better
capacity to judge crowd sizes, I would
have less inexact knowledge. I might
know, for example, that there are
between 60,000 and 80,000 people.
The phenomenon of inexact
knowledge is very general. You can
know on the basis of appearances
someone’s height or age or weight or
distance from you roughly, which is to
say that you can say what heights,
ages, weights and distances are clearly
wrong and thus define a range of
possible answers in the middle. The
better a judge of stadium capacities,
heights, ages, and so on, the smaller
the middle range wherein lies the right
but inaccessible answer.
The Epistemicist likens the exact
number of people in the crowd to the
exact number of grains he says is the
sharp boundary between a heap and a
non-heap. Let us call that exact
number n. As a speaker of English, I
understand the word ‘heap’ and, when
presented with heaps, borderline
heaps and non-heaps, will react
appropriately. As with so many of our
words, our understanding consists in
being able to use ‘heap’ in a certain
way rather than being able to voice a
clear definition of heap. (Look around
you and find a word to classify each
object you can see. Can you define any
of these words precisely? Do you feel
this undermines your claim to be using
these words correctly?)
The Epistemicist says that how we use
‘heap’ in fact determines n but that we
don’t know how our collective use
fixes n. It is not as if we can examine
every possible situation each of us
could be in to see how each of use
would use ‘heap’. Since we can’t see
this ‘total use’, we couldn’t
discriminate it from the total use of a
group of speakers of a language
Schminglish who used ‘heap’ very
much like us but not identically to us.
Since it is use that determines the
sharp boundary and the uses are very
similar but distinct, ‘heap’ in
Schminglish determines a sharp
boundary of - let us say - n+1 grains.
By way of analogy, think of the
speakers of English as a stadium with
74,362 people and the speakers of
Schminglish as a stadium with 74,363
people. In the same way that we can’t
distinguish their total number in either
case, making them appear
indiscriminable, we can’t distinguish
how English and Schminglish speakers
use ‘heap’. So since we can’t
distinguish our use precisely, we can’t
distinguish the number n precisely. We
can only have inexact knowledge. Just
as I can know that the stadium has
more than 2 people and fewer than
1,000,000, I can know that 2 grains
can’t make a heap and 1,000,000 can.
Just as I can’t know that the stadium
contains 74,362 people, I can’t know
whether 74,362 grains make up a
heap. It is a borderline case not
because there is no right answer, as
the semantic approaches claim, but
because I can’t know the right answer.
The semantic approaches start from
the simple observation that the sorites
paradox supposes that every40
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So Who’s Right? Logic
vs. The Incredulous
Stare
statement is true or false. This
supposition is called the ‘principle
of bivalence’. The common
recommendation is then to reject this
principle and allow for more truth-
values. The common problem is that
the logics that result don’t seem to
work properly.
We saw earlier two logical rules (MP)
and (Conj I). A ‘logic’ is a collection of
such rules which tells you what you
can and cannot deduce from your
premises. In order to design a set of
rules, you have to decide how many
truth-values you are going to allow.
For you are in effecting asking
yourself: if A is true/indefinite/etc. and
B is true/indefinite/etc., then can I
deduce C? Classical logic is a system of
rules with the principle that there are
two truth-values, true and false. Non-
classical logics are those that have
different sets of rules and/or more
truth-values.
Classical logic is highly regarded
because its rules capture what we feel
to be patterns of proper reasoning. It is
therefore claimed by many to be logic
that not merely our minds, but any
intelligent mind, would employ.3 It is
therefore claimed that, because of
this, we should accept that every
sentence is indeed either true or false.
This claim would be undermined, of
course, if non-classical logics
outperformed classical logic when it
came to representing reasoning. The
problem is that each non-classical
logic comes in for heavy criticism on
this score. It is alleged that they each
have rules that permit deductions that
are unacceptable. It is not possible to
go into details here. I shall just say
that one of the key planks in the
defence of the Epistemic position is a
demonstration of just how hopeless
the opposing positions are on the
matter of logic.
The Epistemic position needs to build a
solid defence of itself because its
central claim is prima facie so
outrageous as to lead one to think that
any other position is preferable. Its
central claim is that every vague
expression does in fact have a sharp
boundary. Yet there is something
disturbing about the thought that
something we do determines a sharp
boundary that we can’t find. We
should be happy to accept that there
are scientific and mathematical facts
that may escape our knowledge
because we lack the equipment to
measure them and the minds to
understand them. But can it be true
that there are facts about who is tall
and who is bald that are beyond us?
Each position has its advantages and
drawbacks and sorites paradox
remains unsolved. Let’s finish by
looking at two issues that follow from
the initial puzzle and illustrate the
breadth of the issues vagueness raises.
The Epistemicist asks us to believe in
simplicity. There is a sharp but hidden
boundary dividing the Xs from the
non-Xs for all vague expressions X. The
Semanticist rejects this. But is he
merely shifting the problem?
One semantic approach said that there
were three truth-values. Things are
divided into X, borderline case of X and
not-X. If so, does this not mean there
is not one but two sharp divisions?
Consider a line of people who differ
gradually in height. The tallest is 2m
tall, the smallest 1m50cm and each
adjacent pair differ by a half-
centimetre. We don’t believe that
there is a sharp boundary dividing
them into tall and not-tall. Is it any
more obvious where the boundary
between the tall and the borderline
tall is? 
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Higher-Order Vagueness
Our second semantic approach said
that there were lots of truth-values.
Things are divided into many different
degrees of X, from ‘full’ to ‘zero’. If so,
does this not mean that there are lots
and lots of sharp divisions? Here, one
might just say: yes. Every difference in
height is reflected by a difference in
degree of being tall. We therefore
argue as follows. A man 2m10cm in
height and a man 2m in height are
both simply tall. Tall covers a range of
heights. The same is true of not-tall. In
between those heights tall and not-
tall are lots of heights and lots of
different degrees of being tall. Let’s
lump them all together as reflecting
different ways of being borderline tall.
In this way, we resurrect the problem
of the previous paragraph. It seems
that at some point, we must cross a
height marking the end of tall and the
beginning of borderline tall. But
where?
It has seemed to many philosophers
that the problem doesn’t arise because
of higher-order vagueness. So far, we
have said it can be vague whether
someone is tall or not tall and that
such a someone is borderline tall. But
couldn’t someone be a borderline case
of borderline tall? If so, then there is
no boundary between tall and
borderline tall. There is a range of
heights corresponding to borderline
borderline tall.
You may have already guessed what
the next problem is going to be. If
borderline borderline tall is
sandwiched between tall and
borderline tall, then we have even
more sharp boundaries. Where does
tall cross over into borderline
borderline tall? Of course, if borderline
borderline tall can itself have
borderline cases, then we can squeeze
this new category into where a
borderline was supposed to be. But the
problem simply reappears at the next
level up.
Many philosophers think that we have
to admit these higher levels or orders
of vagueness just because it is absurd
to suppose that there are sharp
boundaries between tall, borderline
tall and not-tall. Yet it is not obvious
that it is a price worth paying. It seems
that if we start ‘going up’ we must go
up indefinitely. This means that tall
makes infinitely many fine divisions.
Can this simple little word like heap
hide so much complexity?
A plainer line of attack is that it is
entirely spurious, at least as a means
of avoiding sharp boundaries. We
reason just as we did a moment ago.
There are some things that are, simply,
tall and some that are, simply not-tall.
In between, let there be as many
divisions into degrees of tall and ever-
higher orders of borderline cases of
tall as you wish. Collect them
altogether and label them as n = ‘not
clear cases of tall and not-tall’. Once
again, we seem to have arrived back
with three categories: tall, n, and not-
tall. Once again, we seem to have
arrived back with two sharp divisions,
marking the edge of ‘tall’ (with
everything else) and ‘not-tall’ (with
everything else).
We don’t appear to be any
more knowledgeable about these
boundaries. So where epistemicism
asks us to believe in one hidden and
inaccessible boundary, all semantic
approaches ask us to believe in (at
least) two hidden and inaccessible
boundaries. It is this strange fact that
Epistemicism asks us to believe that
provides a lot of the drive to find an
alternative. If semantic alternatives
are in the same boat, however, then
Epistemicism comes off in a better
light. Or, you might conclude, no-one
comes off in a good light at all.
Vagueness seems to commit us to
sharpness wherever we turn! There is
therefore something very deeply
wrong in how we understand the
relation between minds, language and
the world.
Some say that vagueness is a problem
with defective meanings. Others say
that it is a problem of knowledge of
those meanings. Others still say that
vagueness is a feature of things.
This is a natural view when we are
talking about things we can refer to
with names, such as objects and
places. Does a cloud occupy a precise
space or is it a vague entity with fuzzy
spatio-temporal boundaries? Does
London have a sharp geographical
boundary? Or is it vague whether some
bits of land are part of London or not?
Does London have a sharp
chronological boundary? Did it come
into being at some precise moment?
Or was the transition from the first
settlement to the final city a vague
one?
Many philosophers think that reality
itself is not vague. A man has a precise
height but may be vaguely tall
because of a problem with the word
tall. Equally, there is a precise
configuration of buildings and bits of
land in the world but which parts fall
under ‘London’ is vague through it
being unclear what that word means
as well.
One reason they think this is because
of a famous little argument that
appears to prove that it is incoherent
to suggest that the world might really
be vague. It goes as follows. Let us
suppose it is vague whether London
today (London2004) is identical with
London a thousand years ago
(London1004). It is surely not vague42
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that London2004 is identical with
London2004 - that’s trivial! So there is
something London2004 has that
London1004 lacks. This is the property
of being non-vaguely identical to
London2004.
There is a widely-held view that if x
and y are identical, then they have
identical properties. It follows that if x
and y do not have identical properties,
they are not identical. We have just
found a property that London2004 has
that London1004 lacks. So they are not
identical after all. This contradicts our
assumption that it was vague whether
they were identical. The idea that two
things may be vaguely identical is
therefore paradox-inducing and
unacceptable.
If objects can be vague, then it will not
always be clear whether one object is
identical to another. So if x is a vague
object, there will be an object y such
that it is vague whether x = y. We have
just proved that it is not possible to
say that it is indefinite whether one
object is identical to another. It
follows that objects cannot be vague!
This might seem a bit fishy. Does this
little piece of reasoning really prove
that all clouds are precise entities?
According to most philosophers, the
answer is no. It is true that clouds are
vague entities and it can be true to say
that it is indefinite whether cloud x is
identical to cloud y, just as common
sense demands. What the argument
shows is that we can’t make sense of
this by supposing the vagueness is
somehow a feature of the clouds
themselves. That leads to paradox. The
right conclusion is that vagueness is a
feature of how we refer to these
things.
The semanticist says that when I use
the word ‘cloud’ in ‘that cloud is
fluffy’, I don’t pick out a particular
vague entity. I don’t manage to pick
out any one thing at all. It is vague
what particular region of space I am
referring to. If I wonder whether cloud
x is identical to cloud y, this can be
vague just because it is vague which
two regions I am thinking about.
The Epistemicist says that I do pick out
a precise region of space but I don’t
know which one. When I wonder
whether cloud x is identical to cloud y,
then either it is or it isn’t. I may not be
able to know the right answer. When
this happens, it will be vague whether
they are identical or not.
The vast majority of our words are
vague. We are seduced by the thought
that small differences don’t matter
when it comes to using them. Yet this
leads to the unacceptable conclusion
that they apply to everything and
nothing. The problem of vagueness is
to understand how vague expressions
do have limits and how small
differences can matter. A solution to
this will be a solution to the sorites
paradox. As with so many of the best
philosophical problems, it is simple
and fundamental and continues to vex
philosophers over two millennia after
it was first written down. Not so much
so, however, as to get them out of bed
any earlier on cold winter mornings.
1 We shall assume from now on that 
we are dealing with heaps of grains
of sand. We shall also assume that 
collections of grains of sand have, 
where necessary, the right 
structures and shapes to be heaps.
2 ‘sorites’ translates as ‘heaper, one 
who heaps’
3 We are not trying to capture, in a 
logic, how we actually reason, 
because we often reason illogically.
We are trying to discover the correct
way to reason. In the same way, 
when we do mathematics, we’re not
investigating how we actually 
operate with numbers, because we 
often make mistakes. We are trying
to discover the right answers - the 
answers we should get to if we 
reason correctly.
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Conclusion
Prima facie it seems obvious that the
findings of scientific research
constitute knowledge. Albeit often a
specific and highly detailed type of
knowledge, but knowledge
nonetheless. The question I want to
ask concerns what exactly our
common sense notion of scientific
knowledge amounts to. In doing so, I
suggest that in order to understand a
conception of what scientific
knowledge is, we must look to how we
characterise science in itself. The
reason being that the model of
scientific methodology that we choose
to adopt will govern what kind of
knowledge (if any) science can be seen
to produce. What we need to ask is
which of the models purported to
capture scientific methodology will
best account for our common sense
view of scientific knowledge. It is in
attempting to answer this question
that I turn to two contrasting
accounts of scientific method:
inductivism and falsificationism.  
First and foremost however, we must
decide on what exactly it is that we
commonly understand to be scientific
knowledge. One way to do this is by
first explaining what types of
knowledge do not qualify. There is a
type of knowledge best described as
‘practical’ knowledge, which involves
such things as knowing how to ride a
bicycle or brush one’s teeth
comprehensively. Such knowledge is
non-conceptual or basic and it can
exist without our knowing how to give
verbal expression to it. Certainly I can
choose to reflect upon my possession
of such knowledge, I can state that I
know how to ride a bicycle, but this
reflection is something quite separate
to the practical knowledge itself. It
seems the case that such pieces of
knowledge can act as their own
explanation. That is, if someone
questioned whether I could ride a
bicycle, all I would need do to exhaust
his or her query is to demonstrate my
ability. There is no ‘higher level’
explanation that I should give in order
to justify my knowledge. This is not the
type of knowledge I have in mind for
scientific knowledge.  
Another type of knowledge which I
mean to avoid is that which grounds
our ‘rule-governed’1 behaviour. When
we operate within our society we do
so according to a body of rules or laws
that we must abide by, if we are to
remain in that society. Such things as
‘driving on the left’ or ‘stopping at a
red light’ are examples of this kind of
knowledge. It is perhaps best called
‘procedural knowledge’. Although this
knowledge has conceptual content
which can be expressed in such
propositional form as ‘all cars must
stop at red lights’, it is not the kind of
knowledge with which I am
concerned. If we are asked to justify or
explain a particular instance of this
knowledge, we can only do so by
referring to concerns outside the
actual content of that knowledge.
That is, if asked why it is that you stop
the car at a red light, it would be44
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unlikely that the explanation you
would give would be one involving
certain refracted wavelengths falling
on your retina, being interpreted by
your visual cortex and resulting in leg
contractions which stop the car.
Instead, you would offer either some
general reason ‘that its part of the
legal highway code’ or some moral
concern ‘because I don’t want to hurt
anyone’. 
The type of knowledge I have in mind
is that which we claim offers us
explanation of the way the world is. It
is a type of propositional knowledge
that takes the form of statements such
as ‘cats miaow whereas dogs bark’, or
that ‘kicking a football makes it move’.
I will call this knowledge ‘operational
knowledge’ as it seems both a result of,
and a basis for, our operation within
the world. It is this type of
propositional form that we tend to
give to scientific claims about the
world. Note that this is not say that all
our claims to operational knowledge
are obviously reducible to, or
dependent upon, scientific claims. On
the contrary, scientific claims can be
seen on occasion to offer
complimentary but quite separate
explanations of the world. In terms of
the above examples, scientific
knowledge might make claims as to
the biology of a cat’s larynx, and the
principles of movement and inertia. 
The common view of scientific
knowledge is that it constitutes some
specialised part of this body of
operational knowledge. The kind of
claims I have in mind could be such
things as ‘water boils at 100 degrees
centigrade’ or statements about the
relationship between force, mass and
motion. Any reliable law-like
proposition that scientific research
develops I suggest comes under this
category. 
So let us return to the key question for
scientific methodology, which now
looks something like this. In what
sense, and to what extent, is science
able to provide us with such a
specialised subset of operational
knowledge? On the one hand, science
can be seen to provide us with
universal laws, which we put to work
in both explaining and predicting our
individual observations of the world.
On the other hand, the business of
science can be seen to lie in the
questioning of such laws, in showing
how to refute them, and thereby
taking our operational knowledge
closer to the truth of the world. Put
crudely, these two approaches to
scientific practice are the methods of
inductivism and falsificationism
respectively. Let us look at inductivism
first.   
The methodology of induction in
science is simple: we note an event or
observation repeated again and again
across time and we judge this
regularity to be something we can
depend upon. Each individual
observation reinforces our belief in a
characteristic of the world that
perseveres beyond a specific time and
circumstance. For inductivism,
collating observations in science leads
to the postulation of various scientific
laws. On the basis of these laws, I
presume both that an observation I
may have has been had before, and
that it will continue to be observed on
other occasions by other people long
after I am gone. In other words, these
universal scientific laws offer some
kind of certainty to my individual
observations; what I see on each
occasion is grounded by scientific
rules. In short, these laws tell me how
the world necessarily is, and so give
reason for my trust in this inductive
process. 
So the basic application of our
inductive reasoning is two fold: firstly
we think we can explain what we have
seen by the use of universal laws, and
secondly, that we can use these
established laws in predicting what we
will see.
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There are however, a number of
problems with this picture, concerning
both the mechanics of this inductive
process and the characterisation it
gives of scientific knowledge. First and
foremost there is the question of
whether we are justified in
formulating these universal laws
simply on the basis of a discrete
number of past observations that we
have made. 
Taking a striking example, that owing
to the scientific observation of
planetary motion, science can suggest
the guaranteed law that ‘the sun will
rise every day’. Prima facie, just
because the sun has risen in the past,
it does not mean that it will continue
to do so either tomorrow or the next
day. There is, as it were, no guarantee
that we will ever see the sun rise
again. If this is the case, then it is
certainly detrimental to the sense of
faith we have in our scientific laws of
planetary motions. What we rely upon
is the supposition that some kind of
necessity has caused the sun to rise in
the past and will therefore continue to
cause the sun to rise in the future. The
problem is that any certainty we think
we can obtain from an induced
scientific law turns out to be of no
more use to us in guaranteeing the
truth of the world than any individual
observation in itself.
To understand why, let us look to
Hume. He stated that when we
observe two events to be causally
related, say a kick (e1) causing a ball to
move (e2), what we in fact observe is
only a contingent conjunction of two
events. That is, the causality that we
think we perceive is not actually ‘out
there in the world’ for us to observe.
When we see two events and judge
them to be causally related, it is
merely through a habit of the mind,
something we project onto the world.
A necessary causal link, as such, is not
guaranteed. In the relevant parlance,
there is no necessity in e2 following
e1; nothing to guarantee that the next
occurrence of e1 will be followed by
e2. 
If we accept this proposal, it is a short
step to Hume’s general attack on
inductive reasoning: that there is
nothing in our observation of past or
current events that can tell us about
the way the future will be.2 If we
presume otherwise, we are begging
the question of the uniformity of
nature: that what has always been will
(for apparently no good reason)
continue to be. 
If we return to our example of the sun
rising every day and the scientific
explanation we propose to give in
terms of the causal effects of
planetary motions, we can see that the
Humean objections take hold in the
following way. Whatever scientific
explanation I give in terms of the
observation of regularities in planetary
behaviour, no number of observations
gives me the right to postulate a
universal law. There is no in-built
necessity which we can observe that
tells us the planets will always move in
such a fashion, and that the sun will
thus appear to rise every day. We
simply cannot postulate universal laws
that tell us the way the world
irrefutably is and will always be unless
we have reason to trust such
generalisations. 
Besides which, even if we could trust
such universal laws as ‘the sun will
always rise’ it is not even clear how
many times we would need to see the
sun rise in order to justify first
proposing this law. That is, how many
‘repeated observations’ will suffice for
us to be certain that something is
going to continue to be the case,
either in everyday life or the
laboratory? It seems that in this case
scientific explanation, although
detailed and informative, has no claim
to being the irrefutable truth of the
matter. Indeed, if scientific method is
restricted to induction, it seems our
claims to operational knowledge are
not as certain as we like to think they
are.
These objections give to induction a
kind of naïve quality, it being merely a
habit of the mind to which we
succumb. A method which promises
universal pieces of knowledge, but
inevitably leaves us open to
unwelcome error. If we can do no
better than to follow this inductive
rationale then we are as naïve as
Russell’s chicken: fed every day by the
farmer, expectant of food in the
future, and genuinely surprised by the
unforeseen wringing of its neck.3
So much for induction as providing a
basis for this scientific operational
knowledge. As it stands, this
methodology seems far too error prone
and dogmatic to be the correct
explanation of how we understand the
characteristics of the world.
Karl Popper claimed that this naïveté
which induction displays is a result of
its non-rational or non-logical make-
up. Although not irrational, the
practice of induction does go beyond
what is strictly logical. That is,
proposing an ‘all encompassing’ law
on the basis of a finite number of
observations is thereby to propose
knowledge of that which we simply
don’t know. If scientific method is to
be rational, according to Popper, it
must only make claims to knowledge
that are logically sound. Science is
therefore not in the business of
making grand universal laws, but
instead should concern itself with
the examination of individual
observations. 
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model of falsification can be seen in
the following way: when we make
claims to operational knowledge, we
propose certain non-logical ‘inductive’
laws, and we then rely on science for
their evaluation. That is, the role of
science is different to that proposed by
the method of induction. The job of
science, according to Popper, is to take
these laws which we make through
habit or generalisation, and try to
prove them wrong. That is, as
scientists, we should make it our
business to seek out the observation
that would falsify our law. Upon
observing such a falsifier, we then
discard that particular universal law
and move on to another one. This, in
short, is his technique of ‘falsification’.
In this way, science ‘prunes’ our claims
of operational knowledge in the most
efficient and logical way possible;
finding one falsifier is an easier task
than seeking out every affirmative
case of a universal law. Indeed, as
Popper asserts, the latter may be
something we cannot even do: 
any conclusion drawn (from this
process of induction) may always
turn out to be false: no matter how
many instances of white swans we
may have observed, this does not
justify the conclusion that all
swans are white.4
If we are to accept this model, then
the role of science is to show us how
we are being inaccurate in our claims
to knowledge about the world. That is,
if I believe that ‘all swans are white’,
and a Popperian shows me a black
swan, then my explanation of the way
the world is will stand to be improved
by my discarding of this universal
claim. 
Science isn’t in the business of being
constitutive of our operational
knowledge, it is to be understood as
that which evaluates and refines it.
What we commonly think of, as
scientific claims to knowledge, are
only tenuous hypotheses proposed
with the intention of proving them
wrong. 
There are however, some strange
consequences of this Popperian
methodology. They become obvious
when we ask what happens when one
of our universal laws happens to be
right. That is, what if I claim ‘all ravens
are black’ and they are in fact all
black? For Popper, we can never have
this claim confirmed. Due to its very
nature as a universal law it will always
go beyond what we have the right to
assert. 
If we never see a non-black raven this
does nothing to help our claim. If we
only ever see black ravens, this does
not help to strengthen our claim
either. In fact, for Popper, the best we
can hope for is that a given claim is
corroborated at one instance in time,
it can remain the best theory we have
whilst it sits in the probationary
wings, awaiting its refutation. In sum,
a universal law can never be judged to
be right - even if it is - as in principle
we may always discover a falsifier.
Intuitively, this just seems in direct
conflict with our understanding of
what knowledge is. That is, we want it
to be something substantial and
dependable, not something that is
only useful to us in one restricted time
and circumstance. When we set out to
explain the subset of operational
knowledge claims that we commonly
know to be ‘scientific knowledge’ we
did not intend to discard its status as
knowledge altogether.
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Nevertheless, if we maintain that our
operational knowledge consists of sets
of universal statements about the
world then Popper’s revelations are
right to question the status of this as
‘knowledge’. If Popper is right, then all
we can ever know with logical
certainty is that on one occasion we
have proved a universal law to be
wrong. 
So where does this leave our question
as to what scientific knowledge
consists in? As it stands, we have two
answers, depending on which
methodology of science we choose to
favour. According to inductivism, we
have a type of operational knowledge
which takes the form of universal
scientific laws that we induce from
observing repeated instances of a
phenomenon. These laws seem to give
the sense of certainty that we require
from knowledge, that what we are
claiming to know has some grounding
above and beyond the individual case
that we perceive here and now.
However in light of Humean and
Popperian thought, such certainty
seems to be purely illusory. On the
other hand, falsificationism tells us
that scientific knowledge consists in
telling us about what is not the case,
it is the process of showing how and
why these laws fall short of a correct
explanation of the world. As a
consequence however, we cannot
claim to have certainty in any positive
claim about the world. Prima facie, it
seems that neither of these options is
immediately attractive. We seem to
either be allowed a body of scientific
knowledge which is logically flawed,
or we have a rather paradoxical type
of knowledge which only consists of
judgements of what is not the case. In
neither case does our common sense
view of scientific knowledge
demonstrate any kind of justifiable
reliability.
Arguably, what seems to be the
problem is the pivotal role both
methodologies give to the idea of a
universal law. By taking opposing
stances as to the possible truth of a
universal law it seems inductivists fail
to accommodate the possibility of
falsifying instances, whereas
falsificationists rule out the possibility
of substantive knowledge of any
universal law. Does it really have to be
the case that we either know
something to always be the case,
throughout time and space, or, on the
other hand, that we simply can only
know for certain what we don’t know? 
Perhaps what we need to ask is
whether our claims to knowledge need
have this ‘universal’ character. Instead
let us consider a statement such as ‘I
know the sun will probably rise
tomorrow based on what I have
experienced’. What is the difference
between this and a universal law like
‘the sun will always rise’? Well, in the
former I acknowledge that my
experience is playing a role in my
judgement. That is, I clearly admit to
using a reference class that is limited
in scope both in terms of the number
of observations it depends upon, and
the time scale over which they
were obtained. What we are
accommodating for is the possibility of
error. Whilst we may claim to know
something on the basis of the
information we have, this is not the
same as claiming that the state of the
world will never deviate from how the
scientific community has hitherto
descibed it.  This would mean that our
body of scientific knowledge is not
claiming to present universal truths,
but only suggests that we can
accommodate our observations of the
world so far under certain probabilistic
claims.
Nevertheless there are objections to
this type of suggestion. The first of
which concerns the risk of invoking
what Popper calls pseudo-science.5
From a Popperian standpoint, universal
laws are not only the targets of
scientific attack, they are a necessary
part of scientific practice. That is, the
problem with non-universal or
‘probable’ statements like the one I
proposed above is that they do not
admit of conditions in which they can
be falsified, and hence ultimately, be
rejected. If a statement cannot be
falsified then it simply isn’t scientific,
and is merely a piece of ‘psuedo-
science’. However, this objection is not
as damaging as it first appears. We
can still find a valuable role for
falsification even when we disregard
universal laws. When we say
something has always been the case
and therefore it is probable that it will
continue to be that way, evidence
showing cases both where this is
realised and where it is rejected are of
the utmost importance to us. The first
type of evidence strengthens the
probability of a claim to knowledge
and the second type weakens it. The
difference in relation to Popper’s
account is that falsifying evidence is
used to develop theories and not
simply as a means with which to
categorically discard them.
From a philosophical standpoint
perhaps the more compelling
objection that we should consider
regarding these probabilistic
knowledge claims is the relationship
between knowledge and truth. When
we held in place that knowledge
existed in the form of universal laws it
was easy to imagine how a given piece
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of knowledge was either true or false:
it depended quite simply on whether
the law was right or wrong. However,
in terms of these ‘probabilistic’
scientific claims I have introduced, it is
not immediately clear that we can
claim to know with such certainty
whether they admit of categorical
truth or falsity. That is, it is hard to see
when we would reject a law as false.
Even if we find a falsifier, it is hard to
judge when its occurrence is
improbable enough to warrant
rejection of that law.  
In other words, it is arguably a
consequence of abandoning the idea
of a universal law that we no longer
have a black and white picture of
when we have truth. However, even if
this is the case, this is not to say that
we cannot have knowledge. Truth and
knowledge are not the same thing. We
certainly like to think of truth as
something definitive or categorical,
and it is for this reason that I suggest
truth to provide something like a
normative condition for scientific
knowledge. It is the job of science to
refine theories in the face of evidence
until they thereby come closer to what
we call truth. This suggestion seems
favourable with regard to the
phenomenological aspect of
knowledge, as although we would
never claim knowledge of something
that we suspected to be false, we are
still prepared to rectify or adjust our
claims to knowledge in the face of
new evidence. In fact, in reality we
accept that knowledge is ‘not a precise
conception’ and that ‘it merges into
“probable opinion.”’6
Besides, it is a further point that being
‘true’ in itself is not the only support a
piece of knowledge can have. As
Russell stated: 
A body of individually probable
opinions, if they are mutually
coherent, become more probable
than any one of them would be
individually. It is in this way that
many scientific hypotheses acquire
their probability.7
Although this ‘coherence’ of
knowledge claims with one another
cannot guarantee that any of them are
actually true, it still offers a kind of
structural support. That is, although
science may not provide definitively
true knowledge, it does offer an
internally supportive network of
claims from which explanations and
propositions can be extracted and put
to use. 
Arguably, science is in the business of
working toward the truth, and if we
had it already science would be
redundant. I think we can accept that
our claims to scientific knowledge are
true only in the face of what has been
experienced so far. Although scientific
method may not produce infallible
claims to knowledge, it must be borne
in mind that it is only a potential for
error that we admit. This does not
equate to our being in a state of
constant uncertainty. On the contrary,
it seems that a degree of error is
something we would be wise to admit.
Or, as Russell put it:  
all our knowledge of truths is
infected with some degree of
doubt, and a theory which ignored
this fact would be plainly wrong8
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